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The corporate receivership had its origin in the courts of equity,
but North Carolina enacted statutes governing receivership at an early
date." Although the provisions on this subject are fairly explicit,
especially in regard to the procedural aspects of receivership law, they
do not restrict the inherent power of an equity court to order a receiver-
ship in an appropriate case. 2 Rather they leave the matter in the sound
discretion of the judge.3
An ancillary remedy, receivership is used principally "(1) to pre-
serve, pendente lite, specific property which is the subject of litigation;
(2) to tide an individual or corporation over a temporary period of
financial embarrassment; and (3) as a State substitute for Federal
Bankruptcy, to prevent preferences and to assure the equitable distri-
bution of the assets of an insolvent." 4  Corporate receivership is res-
tricted almost entirely to the last point.
APPLICATION AND HEARING
A prerequisite to any application for a receiver is the issuance of
summons and the filing of the complaint in the principal action. Such
summons "must be served on the corporation by service on an officer
or agent upon whom other process can be served, and shall be served
on the stockholders, creditors, dealers and any others interested in the
affairs of the company" by publication,5 which will also be sufficient
tThe subject matter of this paper was assigned to the author as a research
project in the seminar course on Debtors' Estates given in the spring semester,
1953.
* Former co-editor-in-chief of THIE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REvIv.
' See N. C. REv. STAT. c. 26 (1837) ; N. C. REv. CODE c. 26 (1854) ; N. C. CODE
c. 16 (1883); N. C. REv. §§ 1219-1232 (1905).
'Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 45 S. E. 2d 555 (1947) ; Lewis
v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 99 N. C. 11, 18 S. E. 52 (1888); Skinner v. Max-
well, 68 N. C. 400 (1873).
'J. L. Thompson Co. v. Pope, 183 N. C. 123, 110 S. E. 765 (1922).
'Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 395, 45 S. E. 2d 555, 560
(1947).
'N. C. GF.N. STAT. § 55-131 (1950) ("publishing a copy [of the summons]
at least weekly for two successive weeks in some newspaper printed in the county
in which the corporation has its principal place of business, or if there is no such
newspaper published, by posting a copy of the summons at the dooe of the court-
house of such county, and publishing a copy for the time and in the manner afore-
said in a newspaper published nearest the county seat of the county in which the
corporation has its principal place of business or in a newspaper published in the
city of Raleigh.").
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service on the corporation itself "if no officer can after due diligence
be found in the State."6 Then, since "any judge of the superior court
with authority to grant restraining orders and injunctions has like juris-
diction in appointing receivers,"' 7 application may be made to any judge
of the superior court in the district, whether he is the resident judge,
or the one assigned to the district, or the one holding the courts therein
by exchange, for appointment of a receiver.8  A clerk of court does
not have authority to appoint a receiver,9 nor does a justice of the
peace.'
0
The application must be in writing and should state specifically the
facts which justify receivership." The complaint may be used as an
affidavit, or submitted with additional affidavits. 2 The resident judge
or the judge holding the courts of the district may hear the application
and issue an order setting a date and place for the hearing, and direct-
ing the corporation to show cause why receivership should not be
allowed. Such hearing may be held before any superior court judge
of the district, as, for example, the resident judge on a day after the
close of the term. 13 If the application for the receiver is made at term
time, generally no notice is required, since the parties, being in court,
are charged with notice of all proceedings. 14 Although fixing the place
for hearing outside the district in which the principal action is pending
is improper, this is a mere irregularity which, if not excepted to in
apt time, cannot be used as the basis of appeal.15
In emergency cases, where it seems probable that the property may
be destroyed, secreted, or removed unless action is taken immediately,
any judge of the superior court may order a temporary receivership
without notice, making the order returnable before the proper judge
within twenty days and providing that notice be given to the other
party to appear for a hearing, which can be held anywhere in the dis-
trict."6 In such a case, the plaintiff must give "a written undertaking,
executed by two sufficient sureties to be approved by the judge, to
the effect that the plaintiff will pay all damages, not exceeding the sum
mentioned in the undertaking, which the corporation may sustain by
Ibid.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-501 (1953).'Worth v. Piedmont Bank, 121 N. C. 343, 28 S. E. 488 (1897); Corbin v.
Berry, 83 N. C. 28 (1880); N. C. GEN. STAT. 1-493 (1953).
'York v. McCall, 160 N. C. 276, 76 S. E. 84 (1912).
"o Marshall v Western North Carolina R. R., 92 N. C. 322 (1885).
" See McINxosir, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 891, P. 1007
(1929).
12 See City National Bank v. Bridges, 114 N. C. 381, 19 S. E. 642 (1894).
"3 Stith v. Jones, 101 N. C. 360, 8 S. E. 151 (1888).
"Hemphill v. Moore, 104 N. C. 379, 10 S. E. 313 (1889) (case involved in-
junction, but same principle applies).
" Galbreath v. Everett, 84 N. C. 546 (1881).'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-493, 494 (1953).
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reason of the . . . appointment of the receiver, if the court finally
decides that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
'17
At the hearing on the order to show cause, all "stockholders, credi-
tors or dealers or other parties interested may intervene in said pro-
ceedings and become parties thereto for themselves, or for others in
like interest, under such rules as the court for the purpose of justice
prescribes."1 8  The corporation may resist the application, or, as is
often the case where the corporation is insolvent, it may admit the
allegations of the complaint and join in the prayer for the appointment
of a receiver. If the latter course is pursued and it later appears that the
action was not taken in good faith, the proper means of attacking the
receivership would be by motion in the cause and appeal rather than
by collateral attack.19 Our court has pointed out that:
' * * if done in good faith, such admissions are insufficient to
show fraud or collusion, nor does it deprive the proceeding of its
adversary character, or the court of its jurisdiction. In many
instances the owner of property for which a Receiver is sought
cannot in good faith deny the allegations of the complaint, and
the best interest of such defendant may require acquiescence in
the request for a Receiver.
20
PROPER CASES FOR RECEIVERSHIP
Because of the ancillary nature of receivership, a party seeking re-
ceivership before judgment must show two things to the satisfaction
of the court: (1) an apparent right to the final relief requested in the
main action, and (2) facts which justify the court's taking control of
the corporate assets in the interim.2 ' Receivership cannot be obtained,
then, as an end in itself. It is not granted as a matter of right, but
rests in the sound discretion of the court.22 Since receivership un-
avoidably results in severe damage to the credit and reputation of a
corporation, it is considered a harsh remedy and the courts jealously
restrict its application. 23 Therefore, the judge in passing on a motion
for a receiver must consider the consequences of the action to both
parties, and must not unnecessarily injure one to remove "some slight
1"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-135 (1950).18N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-131 (1950).
"' Where the order for receivership is regular on its face, it is not subject to
collateral attack even where the receivership is by consent. Hall v. Shippers Ex-
press, Inc., 234 N. C. 38, 65 S. E. 2d 333 (1951) (Same attorney represented
both plaintiff-creditor and the corporation).
"0 Id. at 40, 65 S. E. 2d at 335.
-' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-502 (1953) ; Summit Silk Co. v. Kinston Spinning Co.,
154 N. C. 421, 70 S. E. 820 (1911); Witz, Biedler & Co. v. Gray, 116 N. C. 48,
20 S. E. 1019 (1895).
"J. L. Thompson Co. v. Pope, 183 N. C. 123, 110 S. E. 765 (1922).
-" Neighbors v. Evans, 210 N. C. 550, 187 S. E. 796 (1936); Woodall v.
North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 201 N. C. 428, 160 S. E. 775 (1931).
1954]
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disadvantage to the other." 24 He should "weigh all the circumstances,
including the nature of the property and its likelihood to be destroyed
or spirited away during the litigation, and the probability on the other
hand of its value being seriously impaired by its being placed in the
hands of a receiver. ....25
The above approach is the basis for the holding that ordinarily a
simple contract creditor should not be granted a receivership of the
debtor corporation, absent its cQnsent, unless he has "some peculiar
equity or beneficial interest in the property of the corporation," since
he has not pursued his remedy at law.2 0  Similarly a simple tort
creditor who has not reduced his claim to judgment is probably not
entitled to receivership to safeguard his rights.2 7  Where the unsecured
creditors bring a creditor's bill in equity, however, seeking dissolution
of the corporation and division of its assets among themselves and all
other creditors, the greater equity they command may justify receiver-
ship.28 Of course, the judgment creditor who has had execution re-
turned unsatisfied has a clear right to a receiver, since he has exhausted
his remedy at law.29
Receivership is rarely employed in actions against solvent corpora-
tions, since there is little danger that the plaintiff will be unable to
realize on the relief which he may obtain in the main action. Thus
receivership is not granted where a fraudulent conveyance is alleged,
but there is no showing that the party to whom the property was trans-
ferred is insolvent,30 or where plaintiff's property is in defendant's
possession under contract and no danger of insolvency is established.8 1
2 Venable v. Smith, 98 N. C. 523, 526, 4 S. E. 514, 515 (1887).
"Whitehead v. Hale, 118 N. C. 601, 603, 24 S. E. 360 (1896). Receivership
is proper where the debtor has confessed judgments with fraudulent intent and
executions have been levied on the only property of the debtor within the state in
favor of non-resident creditors who seek to remove such property from the state.
Stern & Co. v. Austern, 120 N. C. 107, 27 S. E. 31 (1897).
" Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 396, 45 S. E. 2d 555, 561
(1947) ("The action on the debt is an action at law, involving no equity, whereas
receivership proceedings are equitable in nature and receivers are appointed ...
in furtherance of some equitable relief to which the applicant establishes a prima
facie right."). The language in Summit Silk Co. v. Kinston Spinning Co., 154
N. C. 421, 70 S. E. 20 (1911) would indicate that such a creditor could obtain
a receivership. However, it should be noticed that the creditor in that case was
one who sold on a conditional sale contract.
27 The holding of Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., supra note 26, would seem
to bar such a remedy.
2 Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 397, 45 S. E. 2d 555, 561
(1947).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-363 to 1-366 (1953). Where the tax list has been
delivered to the sheriff and he has been unable to collect, this is equivalent to
having an execution returned unsatisfied, and the taxing body may obtain a re-
ceivership. State and Guilford County v. Georgia Co., 112 N. C. 35, 17 S. E. 10
(1893).
"0 Rheinstein v. Bixby & Katz, 92 N. C. 307 (1885) ; Levenson & Co. v. Elson,
88 N. C. 182 (1882).
1 Ellington & Guy, Inc. v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137 S. E. 869 (1927). Nor
[Vol. 32
CORPORATE RECEIVERSHIP
Nor can a plaintiff who deposited his stock with a solvent corporation
as collateral for a note which he gave to secure the purchase price
obtain receivership in his action for an accounting of the assets.
82
Even where the deed of trust on which the action is brought specifically
provides for receivership on filing of suit for default, the court can
exercise its equitable power to refuse the appointment.
3
In such cases, the court can instead exercise its prerogative to
accept from the defendant a bond payable to the plaintiff in an amount
double the sum demanded by him, with at least two justified sureties to
protect the plaintiff during the action.34 This bond is a substitute
for receivership, and prevents all persons who are parties at the time
it is given from later renewing their request for a receiver, although
it does not bar others from so applying.35 It can be accepted at the
outset, and may be also taken after receivership has been ordered, in
which case the receiver will be discharged and the assets returned. 6
Even though the defendant subsequently goes bankrupt, the state court
can order the cause to proceed to trial, any judgment rendered to be
collectible by execution, only from the sureties, who would then prove
such judgment as a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.3 Only in
the rare case where the solvent defendant refuses to give bond or co-
operate with the court in other respects would receivership be granted.3 8
Receiverships, consequently, are ordered principally in cases where
it is apparent that the corporation is dying from inactivity or lack of
funds and that court control for the protection of its creditors will do
little additional harm to the company. Usually dissolution is requested
as part of the main relief.
Dissolution may be sought in a civil action by the corporation itself,
by a creditor or stockholder, or by the authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral in the name of the State where the corporation is "insolvent,39
will it be granted in a suit for rescission where the insolvency of defendants is
not shown. Carter v. Hoke, 64 N. C. 309 (1869).
*2 Huet v. Piedmont Springs Lumber Co., 138 N. C. 493, 50 S. E. 846 (1905).
"Woodall v. North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 201 N. C. 428, 160 S. E.
475 (1931).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-503 (1953) ; Woodall v. North Carolina Joint Stock
Land Bank, 201 N. C. 428, 160 S. E. 475 (1931) ; Hurwitz v. Carolina Sand &
Gravel Co., 189 N. C. 1, 126 S. E. 171 (1924) ; Jones v. Jones, 187 N. C. 589,
122 S. E. 370 (1924).
"Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 45 S. E. 2d 555 (1947).
'o See Gordon v. Calhoun Motors, Inc., 222 N. C. 398, 23 S. E. 2d 325 (1942).
'Ibid. But see Thompson v. Dillingham, 183 N. C. 566, 112 S. E. 321 (1922).
"See Hurwitz v. Carolina Sand & Gravel Co., 189 N. C. 1, 126 S. E. 171(1924).
" "Insolvent" has been defined as "unable to meet liabilities after converting
all of the property or assets belonging to the person or estate into money, at
market prices, and applying the proceeds, with the cash previously on hand, to
the payment of them." Silver Valley Mining Co. v. North Carolina Smelting
Co., 119 N. C. 417, 418, 25 S. E. 954 (1886). However, such an extreme condi-
tion is not required, since N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-124 (1950) makes "imminent
1954]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or suspends its ordinary business for want of funds, or is in imminent
danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate rights. '40 In such
a case a receiver may be appointed by the court under the same regu-
lations that are provided by law for the appointment of receivers in
other cases.4 1 A receiver may also be appointed where the corporate
existence has expired by limitation.
42
The above statutes, although used in the majority of cases to obtain
receivership, do not provide the only authority for seeking a receiver.
Nor do they create an absolute right to such provisional relief. The
court must still balance the equities of the parties to arrive at its de-
cision. Thus, receivership will be allowed where the insolvency coupled
with corporate action to dispose of assets threatens the safety of the
fund and bond is not offered.4 (In cases of serious insolvency such
security would be impossible to raise.)
Where property sold under conditional sale is being used by the
insolvent buyer and is rapidly depreciating in value, receivership can
be used to preserve such property.44 In a proper case receivership
might be available to preserve a corporation where a deadlock among
the owners or directors threatened the solvency of the company.
44a
Even though insolvency is admitted, however, if it appears that
the property is appreciating rather than depreciating in value, and that
there is little likelihood that the corporation will dispose of its assets,
a court will be reluctant to grant a receivership before judgment-
especially when the major part of the worth of the company lies in its
goodwill which would be destroyed by a receivership. 45 Furthermore,
danger of insolvency" sufficient. See Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C.
516, 86 S. E. 358 (1915) (The company's "condition from the present manage-
ment is such as to threaten loss, if not eventually insolvency . ...
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-124 (1950). Also: N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-126, 129
(1950)." N. C. GE. STAT. § 55-147 (1950).
42 Ibid.
""'The safety of the fund is threatened both by the fraud and insolvency of
the defendants." Peoples National Bank v. Waggoner, 185 N. C. 297, 117 S. E.
6 (1923) (defendant partnership had fraudulently obtained funds of plaintiff bank
and was spending them in its business); Wilson Cotton Mills v. C. C. Randle-
man Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 475, 20 S. E. 770 (1894) (suit to set aside assign-
ment for benefit of creditors); City National Bank v. Bridgers, 114 N. C. 381,
19 S. E. 642 (1894) (assignment to allegedly insolvent trustee; defendants denied
trustee's insolvency and refused to offer bond); Nimocks v. Cape Fear Shingle
Co., 110 N. C. 230, 14 S. E. 684 (1892) (confession of judgment on allegedly
fictitious debts in favor of corporate officers; corporation merely asserted that
debts were genuine) ; Forsaith Machine Co. v. Hope Mills Lumber Co., 109 N. C.
576, 13 S. E. 869 (1891) (corporation delayed registration of plaintiff's mortgage
until it had confessed judgment in favor of officers and secured them with mort-
gage).
aSummit Silk Co. v. Kinston Spinning Co., 154 N. C. 421, 70 S. E. 820 (1911).
I" But such relief cannot be given in summary proceedings. In re Hotel
Raleigh, Inc., 207 N. C. 521, 177 S. E. 648 (1934).
"'Whitehead v. Hale, 118 N. C. 601, 24 S. E. 360 (1896).
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any inequitable conduct on the part of the plaintiff may bar such an-
cillary relief, as where the deed of trust which secures his bond pro-
vides that no bondholder can request a receiver, and there has been
no demand upon the trustee to sue for foreclosure.4 6 It has been
pointed out that requesting receivership in violation of an arbitration
clause "will be considered as a strong circumstance, with the other
evidence, as to the right of the party who breached the agreement to
have a receiver appointed."
47
Failure to pay dividends, in itself an indication of financial distress,
can be the basis for involuntary dissolution and receivership. It is
provided by statute that when "stockholders owning one-fifth or more
in amount of the paid-up stock of any corporation organized under the
laws of and doing business in this State" can show that in the three
preceding years there have not been sufficient earnings "to pay in good
faith an annual dividend of four per cent upon the paid stock of the
corporation," 48 or that "the corporation has paid no dividend for six
years preceding said application," or where stockholders owning one-
tenth or more of the paid-up common stock can prove that there has
been no dividend on the common stock for ten years, after hearing the
judge "may adjudge a dissolution of the corporation and shall appoint
one or more receivers. '49  If it appears to the court that the corpora-
tion is either insolvent or in imminent danger of insolvency, it may
appoint a temporary receiver pending dissolution. However, it has
been held that if it appears that the failure to earn dividends was due
to temporary conditions rather than mismanageinent, dissolution and
receivership will not be allowed.5 1 Nor can a stockholder obtain relief
under the statute if it appears that he participated in the management
and did not object to the corporate action which was calculated to
expand capital.
2
So far some of the causes of dissolution, and instances where re-
ceivership may be granted pending dissolution have been noted. But
dissolution may also be allowed on a voluntary basis where the board
of directors deem it advisable and two-thirds of the stockholders con-
sent in writing to such action. 3  Involuntary dissolution can be
ordered where there has been abuse of corporate powers to the injury
"' Jones v. Atlantic & Western R. R., 193 N. C. 590, 137 S. E. 706 (1927).
" Ellington & Guy, Inc. v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 613, 137 S. E. 869, 871
(1927).
," Kistler v. Caldwell Cotton Mills Co., 205 N. C. 809, 172 S. E. 373 (1933)
(No distinction is made between preferred and common stock in applying this
5% rule)."N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1950).
"0 Ibid.
"Kistler v. Caldwell Cotton Mills Co., 205 N. C. 809, 172 S. E. 373 (1933).
52 Winstead v. Hearne Brothers & Co., 173 N. C. 606, 92 S. E. 613 (1917).
's N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-121 (1950).
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of the public or of the stockholders, creditors or debtors of the com-
pany,54 or non-user of the corporate powers for two or more consecu-
tive years,5 5 or where the corporation has been convicted of a persistent
criminal offense.56
Where dissolution is ordered the corporate existence is continued
by statute for three years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
actions by or against the company, and enabling it gradually to settle
and close its concerns, to dispose of its property, and to divide its
assets.57 During this time the directors may be continued as trustees
with extensive powers,58 or the court may remove them on application
of a stockholder or creditor 59 and appoint receivers. 60 The statutory
remedy is exclusive of all others, and failure to institute receivership
within the three-year period bars subsequent relief.61
ORDER AND REvIEW
The judge's decision as to whether or not receivership is to be
granted, based on the factors already discussed, is embodied in his
order. However, it is not proper to settle finally questions raised by
the pleadings as to the rights of the parties in disposing of the motion
for a receiver.62  Though the ruling should be accompanied by a find-
ing of fact, it is sufficient for the judge merely to examine the affidavits
and determine whether sufficient cause was shown for ancillary relief03
unless the losing party requests specific findings. 64  The facts must be
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-124 (1950).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-124, 55-126, 55-127 (1950). There is no minimum
number of shareholders required. Lasley v. Walnut Grove Mercantile Co., 179
N. C. 575, 103 S. E. 213 (1920).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-124 (1950). There have been instances where a cor-
poration was dissolved by legislative enactment. Western North Carolina R. R.
v. Rollins, 82 N. C. 524 (1880).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-132 (1950).
"'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-133 (1950).
" "Anyone who has a right to require the fulfillment of an obligation or con-
tract for the payment of money is a creditor in the strict technical sense of the
term-any one, in other words, who has a debt or demand against another upon
contract, express or implied, for the payment of money." Summit Silk Co. v.
Kinston Spinning Co., 154 N. C. 401, 428, 70 S. E. 820, 823 (1911). The rule of
Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 396, 45 S. E. 2d 555, 561 (1947)
would probably not apply where the receivership was requested by a simple con-
tract or tort creditor after the corporation had been dissolved, since receivership
would not injure the company in such a case.
'o N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-139 (1950). See Latta v. Catawba Electric Co., 146
N. C. 285, 59 S. E. 1028 (1907).
" Von Glahn v. De Rosset, 81 N. C. 468 (1879). However, the statutory bar
arises only in cases of actual dissolution; mere cessation of business activity is
not enough. Heggie v. Peoples Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 107 N. C. 581, 12 S. E.
275 (1890).
". Forsaith Machine Co. v. Hope Mills Lumber Co., 109 N. C. 576, 13 S. E.
869 (1891) (not proper to decide questions raised as to validity of judgments
confessed by corporation or the effectiveness of the mortgage or deed of trust).
"' City National Bank v. Bridgers, 114 N. C. 381, 19 S. E. 642 (1894).
"Whitehead v. Hale, 118 N. C. 601, 24 S. E. 360 (1896).
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reduced to writing, but it is permissible to postpone this provided it
is done within a reasonable time after the order is entered. 3 When
the order is regular on its face and the court is one with jurisdiction
in receivership cases and possesses jurisdiction over the subject-matter,
the order is not subject to collateral attack.66 Instead, appeal is the
proper means of securing redress, 67 but there is a presumption that
the order was correct."" Unless specific findings of fact were made,
the judge is presumed to have found the facts for the appellee.6 9 Such
finding of facts is not binding on appeal, however." Where the evi-
dence leaves material questions at issue not free from doubt, the supreme
court will not overrule an order appointing a receiver;71 nor will it
require that the "proof should be as full and as complete as if the trial
was before the jury upon the main issues."
72
SELECTION OF THE RECEIVER
There are no statutory provisions governing the choice of the judge
appointing a receiver for a corporation. Consequently, "the selection
of a receiver is largely in the sound discretion of the judge of the
Superior Court, and such discretion will not generally be reviewed
unless it has been greatly abused."73 A corporation may act as a re-
ceiver. 74 A sheriff may be appointed. 5 In the case of banks the
Commissioner of Banks is a statutory receiver.7 6 Several receivers
may be appointed, although the supreme court has criticized such a
course unless absolutely necessary. 77 It is not necessarily wrong to
chose an attorney in the cause,78 but the court should not select as re-
"5 Forsaith Machine Co. v. Hope Mills Lumber Co., 109 N. C. 576, 13 S. E.
869 (1891) (three or four days after entry is not unreasonable)."0 Hall v. Shippers Express, Inc., 234 N. C. 38, 65 S. E. 2d 333 (1951) ; Rous-
seau v. Call, 169 N. C. 173, 85 S. E. 414 (1915).
"7 Jones v. Thorne, 80 N. C. 72 (1879).
"Whitehead v. Hale, 118 N. C. 601, 24 S. E. 360 (1896).
00 Ibid.
70 Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 45 S. E. 2d 555 (1947);
Pearce Bros. & Co. v. Elwell, 116 N. C. 595, 21 S. E. 305 (1895).7 Nimocks v. Cape Fear Shingle 'Co., 110 N. C. 230, 14 S. E. 684 (1892).
71 Pearce Bros. & Co. v. Elwell, 116 N. C. 595, 597, 21 S. E. 305 (1895).
"' Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 521, 86 S. E. 358, 360
(1915)." Western North Carolina R. R. v. Rollins, 82 N. C. 524 (1880).
5 Simmons v. Allison, 118 N. C. 761, 24 S. E. 740 (1896).
16 Blades v. Hood, 203 N. C. 56, 164 S. E. 828 (1932).
"' Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina Bank, 126 N. C_. 531, 535, 36 S. E.
39, 41 (1900). "The necessity of the appointment of more than one receiver, we
cannot see; and while we do not intend to criticize harshly the action of the
judges who made these appointments, it may be well for us to call attention to
the almost universal habit throughout the whole country to ... appoint more
than one receiver, and to allow them for their services . . .large and excessive
commissions; and that unless the judges .. . exercise cautious scrutiny and
diligent care, great injustice to creditors must result"
71 Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 86 S. E. 358 (1915)
(". .. although it is a practice not to he commended unless done by consent.").
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ceiver a party interested in the action.79 In an extreme case the
receiver might be removed upon application to the proper judge.80
Before he can assume his duties, the receiver must execute and file
with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending a bond pay-
able to the adverse party with at least two sureties in an amount fixed
by the appointing judge, "conditioned for the faithful discharge of his
duties as receiver." 8' The judge has power to order the receiver to
later give a new bond with other sureties.82 An action on this bond
will not lie until the receiver has failed to obey an order of the court
in respect to the assets in his custody, so the proper procedure is to
move in the cause that the receiver be required to account for the
assets, and if after such account he fails to comply with a command
to pay the effects into court, his failure makes both himself and the
sureties liable on the bond.8 3 Leave of court must be obtained to sue
on the bond in an independent action.8 4
EFFECT OF RECEIVERSHIP
The order for receivership, whether it is temporary or permanent,
gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the assets of the corporation
which are within the state at that time. Thereafter no other court
in the state can appoint a receiver for the property, even if the applica-
tion for such relief was before it at an earlier date.85 However, since
the appointment of receivers has no extra-territorial effect, foreign
creditors can still attach corporate property located in another state or
obtain receivership in that state to administer such assets.
85a  I
" Fisher v. Southern Loan & Trust Co., 138 N. C. 91, 50 S. E. 592 (1905)
(plaintiff's attorney) ; Black v. Gentery, 119 N. C. 502, 26 S. E. 43 (1896) (plain-
tiff-stockholders). The practice has been indulged in, however. See Clayton v.
Ore Knob Copper Co., 109 N. C. 385, 14 S. E. 36 (1891) (plaintiff-stockholders).
"Hall v. Shippers Express, Inc., 234 N. C. 38, 65 S. E. 2d 333 (1951)
Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 86 S. E. 358 (1915).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-504 (1953). The party obtaining a receivership must
furnish bond only where the receivership is a temporary one granted without
notice to the corporation. The order is not void, however, for failure to require
a bond from the receiver. Nesbitt & Bros. v. Turrentine, 83 N. C. 536 (1880).
82N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-504 (1953).
83 Bank of Washington v. Creditors, 86 N. C. 323 (1882) ; Atkinson v. Smith.
89 N. C. 72 (1883). If the receiver has already been discharged the order of
discharge may be set aside and vacated for fraud or mistake by a motion in the
cause in which the receiver was appointed. Then his liability on the bond may
be enforced. Haas v. Cathey, 199 N. C. 796, 156 S. E. 92 (1930).
84 Black v. Gentery, 119 N. C. 502, 26 S. E. 43 (1896). However, failure to
allege that leave has been obtained can be cured by failure to demur on that
ground, or where there is demurrer, by averring leave of court, if such were the
fact. Black v. Gentery, supra.
8 Worth v. Piedmont Bank, 121 N. C. 343, 28 S. E. 488 (1897) ("The court
will take notice of fractions of a day."). A dictum in an earlier case had
indicated that priority of application might be the determining factor. See Parks
v. Sprinkle, 64 N. C. 637 (1870).
88. Kruger v. Bank of Commerce, 123 N. C. 16, 31 S. E. 270 (1898) ; Hols-
houser v. Copper Co., 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650 (1905) ; Blackwell v. Life
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In most instances a creditor of the corporation cannot take any effec-
tive steps to improve his position; his rights are frozen as of the time of
the appointment.86 If he has a lien on assets of the corporation and also
has possession, he can continue in possession, but can be ordered not
to sell the property.8 7  If he has already docketed a judgment against
the company and caused execution to issue against its land, he will not
be allowed to have the land sold without leave of court.8 8  He can have
the property under a deed of trust sold only with court approval.8
If he is a resident and intends to bring suit in another state, attaching
corporate property there, he may be enjoined from doing so.90 If he
has already begun suit, but does not succeed in docketing a judgment
until after the appointment, he obtains no priority over the general
creditors. 91 If an operating receivership is decreed, however, it is
proper for one who has already begun suit to proceed with his action
joining the receiver as a party defendant.9 2  Ordinarily a party will
not be allowed to begin separate suit after the commencement of the
receivership, 93 since "the law contemplates the settlement of all claims
against the insolvent debtor in the original action in which the re-
ceiver is appointed. '9 4  However, where a person is injured while
the corporation is being operated by a receiver he may, with leave of
court, institute action against the receiver.9 4a Where the cause of
action arises while the company is being operated by a receiver ap-
Ass'n., 141 N. C. 117, 53 S. E. 833 (1906) (But where the only assets of the
corporation within the state are premiums to become due on policies which carry
no personal liability on the part of the holder it would be useless to appoint a
receiver.)
88 Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1918).
s Huntsman Bros. & Co. v. Linville River Lumber Co., 122 N. C. 583, 29
S. E. 838 (1898).
8 Pelletier v. Greenville Lumber Co., 123 N. C. 596, 599, 31 S. E. 855 (1898).
(The "exclusive possession of the receiver does not interfere with or disturb
any pre-existing liens, preferences or priorities, but simply prevents their execu-
tion by holding the property intact until the relative rights of all parties can be
determined.").
80 C. D. Kenny Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 206 N. C. 591, 174 S. E. 501 (1934).
See Bolich v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335
(1932).
80 Davis v. Butters Lumber Co., 132 N. C. 233, 43 S. E. 650 (1903).
"Odell Hardware Co. v. Holt-Morgan Mills, 173 N. C. 308, 92 S. E. 8 (1917).
But see Dillard v. Walker, 204 N. C. 67, 167 S. E. 632 (1932), commented on in
Note, 11 N. C. L. REv. 365 (1933).
2Alford v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N. C. 719, 164 S. E. 125 (1932);
Black v. Consolidated Railway & Power Co., 158 N. C. 468, 74 S. E. 468 (1912).
"Black v. Consolidated Railway & Power Co., 158 N. C. 468, 74 S. E. 468
(1912).
"National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 233 N. C. 83, 84, 62 S. E. 2d 501, 503
(1950).
"' Wilson v. Rankin, 129 N. C. 447, 40 S. E. 310 (1901) (Where suit is
merely an action to establish a debt and not to interfere with the management
of the company, obtaining leave is a mere formality and omission to do so can
be cured by failure to demur.).
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Although the receiver must qualify before he can assume his duties,
upon appointment he is vested with title to all the real and personal
property of the insolvent corporation, wherever situated, and all its
franchises, rights, privileges and effects 95 and the corporation is divested
of its title to them. 6 The receivership has no effect as concerns the
existence of the corporation itself.97 It does, however, end the powers
of the stockholders and directors, and they can make no contract to
bind the company after the appointment.98 The receiver holds legal
title and possession as the agent of the court for the beneficial owners;
consequently, his title is not such as would cause forfeiture under a
non-alienation clause in a life insurance policy.90 Instead, the assets are
said to be in custodia legis;00 any interference with the receiver's
possession is punishable as contempt of court.101
The receivership in most respects destroys no rights of those who
dealt with the corporation. All lawful liens existing at the time of
appointment continue to exist.10 2 Thus judgments previously docketed
create a lien on the realty, 03 and where personal property has been
levied upon by execution or attachment prior to the receivership this
lien will be respected. Receivership does not have the effect eo instanli
""28 U. S. C. A. § 125 (Supp. 1952); Lassiter v. Norfolk Southern R. R.,
163 N. C. 19, 79 S. E. 264 (1913). However, leave should be obtained where
the cause of action arises before the appointment. Sellers v. Carolina R. R., 205
N. C. 149, 170 S. E, 632 (1933). But an answer to the merits waives the defect.
Hollowell v. Norfolk & Southern Ry., 153 N. C. 19, 68 S. E. 894 (1910).
" N. C. GEa. STAT. § 55-149 (1950); National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236
N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952); Teague v. Teague Furniture Co., 201 N. C.
803, 161 S. E. 530 (1931); Douglass v. Dawson, 190 N. C. 458, 130 S. E. 195
(1925). Under the former practice the receiver held possession of the property
but was not vested with title. Battle v. Davis, 66 N. C. 252 (1872).
"o N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-149 (1950); Yelverton Hardware Co. v. Piland &
Sons Garage Co., 184 N. C. 125, 113 S. E. 601 (1922). Because it cannot control
him, the corporation is not criminally responsible for the receiver's acts. State
v. Norfolk & Southern Ry., 152 N. C. 785, 67 S. E. 42 (1910).
" Pinchback v. Mining Co., 137 N. C. 172, 49 S. E. 106 (1904).
"Lenoir v. Linville Improvement Co., 117 N. C. 472, 23 S. E. 442 (1895).
"' Southern Pants Co. v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 159 N. C. 78, 74 S. E.
812 (1912).
100 Harrison v. Brown, 222 N. C. 610, 24 S. E. 2d 470 (1943) ; State v. White-
burst, 212 N. C. 300, 193 S. E. 657 (1937).
101 Nobles v. Roberson, 212 N. C. 334, 193 S. E. 420 (1937) ; Delozier v. Bird,
123 N. C. 689, 31 S. E. 834 (1898); Corbin v. Berry, 83 N. C. 28 (1880).
"'5 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952);
Roberts v. Bowen Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 27, 85 S. E. 45 (1915) ; Withrell v. Mur-
phy, 154 N. C. 82, 69 S. E. 748 (1910) ; Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina
Bank, 127 N. C. 432, 37 S. E. 461 (1900). "Until such jurisdiction takes hold
of the assets they are subject to the action of the individual creditors, and such
preferences may be made by the corporation as a natural person might make
under the same circumstances of insolvency." Merchants National Bank v.
Newton Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 507, 20 S. E. 765 (1894).




to stop the running of interest on all of the interest-bearing obligations
of the corporation, at least where the liability is for a lien debt. 04
Contractual obligations of the corporation continue, and can be enforced
by'0 5 or against'0 6 the corporation. One exception to the rules above
stated is found in the case of employment contracts. Probably because
of the belief that the officers of the corporation are usually responsible
for its going into receivership, it is ruled that:
* * , performance by a corporation of an executory contract
to pay for services to be rendered by its officers, agents or em-
ployees, pursuant to contracts of employment, subsequent to the
appointment of a receiver for the corporation, becomes impossible
as the result of an act of the law, and that therefore the contract
is discharged.'
0 7
Tax liability of the company continues. 0 8
POWERS OF THE RECEIVER
As an officer, or arm of the court, the receiver proceeds to collect
and conserve the assets under its strict supervision. Within thirty
days after his appointment he must give the court a "full and complete
inventory of all estate, property, and effects of the corporation, its
nature and probable value, and an account of all debts due from and
to it.' '109 The court can also require him to give reports of his actions
at any time during the receivership." 0 He can ask the court for in-
structions as to his duties while in his office."' However, the court will
10. Moore v. Watauga & Yadkin R. R., 173 N. C. 726, 92 S. E. 361 (1917).
But payments by the receivers on a note of the company do not prevent the bar
of the statute of limitations as to the sureties. Shelby National Bank v. Hamrick,
162 N. C. 216, 78 S. E. 12 (1913).
10. Coleman v. Carolina Theatres, Inc., 195 N. C. 607, 143 S. E. 7 (1928)
(but lease can be cancelled if receiver defaults on rent). In cases where the
corporation has failed to perform the conditions required by the contract through
its insolvency and cessation of operations, the other party has the right to treat
the contract as terminated. Wildes v. Nelson, 154 N. C. 590, 70 S. E. 940 (1911)
(contract to sell patented articles and pay royalties to patentee).
"0' Lamson Co. v. Morehead, 199 N. C. 164, 154 S. E. 50 (1930) (lease con-
tract).
"° Wade v. Mutual Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 196 N. C. 171, 174, 145 S. E. 18,
19 (1928). It has also been ruled that in such cases the appointment has the
practical effect of enjoining the company from carrying out the contract. Lenoir
v. Linville Improvement Co., 126 N. C. 922, 36 S. E. 185 (1900).
108 Stagg v. George E. Nisson Co., 208 N. C. 285, 180 S. E. 658 (1935) (fran-
chise tax).
100 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-149 (1950).
110 Ibid.
"11 See Currie v. Southern Manufacturers Club, Inc., 210 N. C. 150, 185 S. E.
666 (1936) (payment of personal property taxes); Stagg v. George E. Nisson
Co., 208 N. C. 285, 180 S. E. 658 (1935) (franchise tax during operating re-
ceivership) ; Simmons v. Allison, 118 N. C. 761, 24 S. E. 740 (1896) (renting
of property).
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not instruct as to the distribution of funds until the receiver has them
in hand."12
To aid him in settling the corporate estate the receivership is given
broad powers. He can send for persons and papers, and "examine
any persons, including the creditors, claimants, president, directors,
and other officers and agents of the corporation, on oath" which he
may administer, in regard to the affairs and transactions of the com-
pany, its assets and debts. If the person refuses to be sworn or answer
the questions, or "refuses to declare the whole truth touching the sub-
ject matter of the examination, the court may, on report of the receiver,
commit such person as for contempt.
1" 3
Although two early decisions held that receivers had no authority
to foreclose under the power of sale in a mortgage held by the cor-
poration,114 at least not unless the mortgagors were before the court,11
the receiver now has this power by statute. He can foreclose mortgages,
deeds of trust, and other liens executed to the corporation."10 At the
foreclosure sale a fee simple title to the land can be conveyed.
117
The receiver can sell, convey and assign all of the estate, rights,
and interest of the corporation."18 However, he does not have authority
to dispose of a capital asset without approval of the court."19 Conse-
quently he should apply for an order to sell such property, 120 and care
should be taken that the owner of the property is not unduly prejudiced
112 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952);
Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 117 N. C. 308, 23 S. E.
450 (1895).
J3 N. C. Gm. STAT. § 55-151 (1950). See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-148
(1950). The court may require that all important papers of the corporation be
turned over to the receiver in the original order setting up the receivership, or
may do so later on plaintiff's motion. Manufacturers & Jobbers Finance Corp. v.
Lane 221 N. C. 189, 19 S. E. 2d 849 (1942).
14 Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 118 N. C. 556, 24
S. E. 116 (1896) ; Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 117 N. C.
308, 23 S. E. 450 (1895).
" "It may be possible, if this point were presented in a case before the Court,
a foreclosure . . .might be sustained, but if we were to so hold in this matter-
where the mortgagors are not before the Court, it would be but obiter and they
would not be bound by it." Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Building and Loan
Ass'n., 118 N. C. 556, 562, 24 S. E. 116, 117 (1896).
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-148 (1950). This authority is also given by N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-150 (1950).
"" Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hudson, 200 N. C. 688, 158 S. E. 244
(1931).
1.1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-148 (1950). Where land is sold by the receiver
without warranty, the transaction is like a sheriff's sale where only the interest
of the execution debtor is sold and if the title purchased is defective the buyer can
get no refund. Tate v. Davis, 152 N. C. 177, 67 S. E. 503 (1910).
11" Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Neuse Mfg. Co., 213 N. C. 489, 196
S. E. 848 (1938). Refusal to grant injunction forbidding the sale of property
in the hands of a receiver but levied upon by a judgment creditor, however, may
constitute implied leave of the court to have the sale. Pelletier v. Greenville
Lumber Co., 123 N. C. 596, 31 S. E. 855 (1898).
120 See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-505 (1953).
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by a sale. In cases where the corporation is insolvent, the property
will have to be sold eventually, so such prejudice will not exist.
121
If the property is encumbered with mortgages or other liens, the legality
of which is in dispute, and is of the type that would deteriorate material-
ly in value pending the litigation, the court may order public or private
sale of the property free of encumbrances, the price to be held in court
subject to the lien. 122 The sale may be made in disregard of the minor
requirements of the deeds or instruments, such as publication of notice,
etc., where this procedure "works no substantial impairment of the
value of the security, and is for the best interest of the owners and
others having claim upon the assets.1' 123  The lien-holder may be al-
lowed to bid in and make payment by deducting the price from the
corporation's debt to him.124  The land can, with consent of the lien-
holder, be offered for sale in the alternative, either encumbered or free
of the lien, and the most satisfactory bid accepted. 125
Unless authority has been expressly given to the receiver by the
court to sell and convey on specified terms,'126 the sale must be confirmed
before the buyer can obtain any rights. Until that time he is a mere
preferred proposer, and bidding can be reopened. 127 Confirmation may
be given outside the county in which the action is pending upon proof
that written notice has been given at least ten days prior to date of
confirmation to each creditor who has filed his claim with the re-
ceiver.'2 8 Where encumbered property is sold clear of liens, the resident
judge of the district or the judge holding the courts of the district may
confirm the sale after the receiver has published notice at least ten
days prior to the confirmation to all interested persons that he will
apply for confirmation. 2 9 The question of confirmation rests prin-
cipally in the sound legal discretion of the judge, and while mere in-
adequacy of price may at times afford good reason for refusing to
confirm a sale, it is not always controlling.130
... Forsaith Machine Co. v. Hope Mills Lumber Co., 109 N. C. 576, 13 S. E.
869 (1891).12 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1950); Martin v. Vanlaningbam, 189 N. C.
656, 127 S. E. 695 (1925).
.2 Lasley v. Scales, 179 N. C. 578, 580, 103 S. -E. 214, 215 (1920).
1"' Kelley v. McLamb, 182 N. C. 158, 108 S. E. 435 (1921).
""Harvey v. Kinston Knitting Co., 194 N. C. 734, 140 S. E. 746 (1927).
1.0 Harrison v. Brown, 222 N. C. 610, 24 S. E. 2d 470 (1943).
Attorney General v. Roanoke Navigation Co., 86 N. C. 409 (1882) (Bid-
dings are reopened when an advance of 10% is offered before confirmation and
in apt time, which is at the term ensuing the sale. Bidding cannot be reopened
after confirmation, however, unless there has been fraud in its broadest sense.).1-28 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-506 (1950). See Atlantic National Bank v. Peregoy-
Jenkins Co., 147 N. C. 293, 61 S. E. 68 (1908) (improper to grant motion for
final sale made outside the county in which action was pending and without notice
to parties to be affected).12" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-154 (1950).
120 Copping v. Hillsboro Clay Mfg. Co., 153 N. C. 329, 69 S. E. 250 (1910)
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To prevent a sale, a motion in the cause is the proper procedure, 13
or where a sale has been made, a motion to recall it can be used, 8 2 but
such motion cannot be made out of the county and district in which
the action was pending and without notice.
8 33
The statute gives the receiver power to appoint agents, and to "do
all other acts which might be done by the corporation, if in being, that
are necessary for the final settlement of its unfinished business."
18 4
Thus, where necessary, he can hire attorneys,135 insure the property, or
hire a watchman to protect it.1a6 He can also rent out the assets'8 7 and
petition the court for permission to pledge them or borrow on them
while winding up the corporate affairs.'1
8
Whether he can operate the company as a going business, however,
is another matter. Certainly this can be done where none of the
creditors object, 39 and the lien creditors may then be required to share
in the expenses. 40  In such a case receiver's certificates may be
authorized, 41 but the date of maturity must not be more than two
years after date of issue.142 However, because of the risk involved to
the rights of the lien creditors, the courts are averse to allowing an
operating receivership of private corporations, "except in cases where
a person or corporation is temporarily financially embarassed and the
temporary stay of creditor pressure is essential to the preservation of
the business. . .. ,,143 Hence, by the latest authority, if an operating
(No higher bid was offered and the property was subject to rapid depreciation).
See Attorney General v. Roanoke Navigation Co., 86 N. C. 409 (1882) (Courts
of equity have absolute power over all sales made under their orders, and can
confirm them or set them aside and re-open bidding.).
... Lasley v. Scales, 179 N. C. 578, 103 S. E. 214 (1920).
.32 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 233 N. C. 644, 65 S. E. 2d 137 (1951).
133 Ibid.
"" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-148 (1950).
... Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 117 N. C. 308, 23
S. E. 450 (1895).
.3 Kelley v. McLamb, 182 N. C. 158, 108 S. E. 435 (1921).
""7 State v. Turner, 106 N. C. 691, 10 S. E. 1026 (1890) ; see also C. D. Kenney
Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 206 N. C. 591, 174 S. E. 501 (1934); Simmons v. Alli-
son, 118 N. C. 761, 24 S. E. 740 (1896).
... Blades v. Hood, 203 N. C. 56, 164 S. E. 828 (1932).
... National Surety Corp., v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952);
Humphey Brothers v. Buell-Crocker Lumber Co., 174 N. C. 514, 93 S. E. 971
(1917).National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 45 S. E. 2d 555 (1947).
"'Ibid., construing N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-89 (1950). See Armour & Co. v.
People's Laundry Co., 171 N. C. 681, 89 S. E. 19 (1916) where certificates were
issued without consent of lienholders.
143 Sinclair v. Moore Central R. R., 228 N. C. 389, 396, 45 S. E. 2d 555, 560
(1947) ; Huntsman Bros. & Co. v. Linville River Lumber Co.. 122 N. C. 583, 29
S. E. 838 (1898); Roberts v. Bowen Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 27, 32, 85 S. E. 45,
48 (1915). There have been cases which held otherwise. See Wood v. Wood-
bury & Pace, Inc., 217 N. C. 356, 8 S. E. 2d 240 (1940) ; Armour & Co. v. People's
Laundry Co., 171 N. C. 681, 89 S. E. 19 (1916), where the business was carried
on without the consent of the mortgagee and he was charged with a share of
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receivership is allowed without the consent of the secured creditors
all losses must be borne by the general creditors.144
SuiT By THE RECEIVER
The corporate receiver has authority to "institute suits for the re-
covery of any estate, property, damages, or demands existing in favor
of the corporation, and he shall, upon application by him, be substi-
tuted as party plaintiff in the place of the corporation in any suit or
proceeding pending at the time of his appointment."' 4 5 Thus he can
sue to recover proceeds of fire insurance,146 realty,1 47 funds wrongfully
withheld by agents,'l48 misappropriated funds,149 preferences, 150 damages
for mismanagement,' 51 and stock assessments. 152 Ordinarily when he
is invested with full power as a receiver he can bring appropriate neces-
sary actions without special leave or direction of the court,15 3 although
the court can restrict this right.T M Such suit can be in the name of
the corporation 5  or in his own'516 or both. 15 7  He can make the cor-
the expense. The holding of this opinion seems abandoned by the ruling in
National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 50, 72 S. E. 2d 109, 123 (1952).
"It would . . .offend the first principle of economic righteousness to permit an
operating receiver to hazard the property rights of lienholders without their con-
sent in a perilous private enterprise merely because the court may entertain the
uncertain hope that some pecuniary advantage might thereby be obtained for the
general creditors or some other third persons." See Note, 19 N. C. L. REV.,
89 (1940)... National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
1. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-148 (1950). See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-366
(1953) (Court may by order forbid debtor of corporation to dispose of property
pending judgment in receiver's suit). Seminole Phosphate Co. v. Johnson, 188
N. C. 419, 124 S. E. 859 (1924) (Corporation instituted suit, and after it became
insolvent receiver was made a party plaintiff).
1,0 See Clark Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 130, 75
S. E. 944 (1912).
", See Harris v. Hilliard, 221 N. C. 329, 20 S. E. 2d 278 (1942); Asheville
Division v. Ashton, 92 N. C. 579 (1885).
1"' See Cummer Lumber Co. v. Seminole Phosphate Co., 189 N. C. 206, 126
S. E. 511 (1925).
..9 See La Vecchia v. North Carolina joint Stock Land Bank, 218 N. C. 35,
9 S. E. 2d 489 (1940) ; Bank of Vance v. Crowder, 194 N. C. 312, 139 S. E. 604
(1927).
150 See text at notes 195 to 202. ... See text at notes 190 to 193.
.5. See text at notes 203 to 218.
15. Van Kempen v. Latham, 201 N. C. 505, 160 S. E. 759 (1931); Weill v.
First National Bank, 106 N. C. 1, 11 S. E. 277 (1890). Under the former chan-
cery rule the receiver could not sue without order of the court. See Battle v.
Davis, 66 N. C. 252 (1872).
... Van Kempen v. Latham, 201 N. C. 505, 160 S. E. 759 (1931); Weill v.
First National Bank, 106 N. C. 1, 11 S. E. 277 (1890).
15 Clark Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 130, 75
S. E. 944 (1912); Smathers v. Western Carolina Bank, 135 N. C. 410, 47 S. E.
893 (1904); Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371 (1894).
1 Clark Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 130, 75
S. E. 944 (1912); Gray v. Lewis, 94 N. C. 392 (1886). Under the former prac-
tice the receiver could sue only in the name of the corporation. Battle v. Davis, 66
N. C. 252 (1872).
1.7 Clark Millinery Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 160 N. C. 130, 75
S. E. 944 (1912).
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poration a party, or sue as the sole plaintiff.'58 In either case it is
essentially a suit by the corporation. 159 When he sues as receiver, for
venue purposes, his personal residence controls.1 60 If his authority
as receiver is challenged he can prove it by a copy of the order ap-
pointing him. 61 Service on the receiver is service on the corpora-
tion,'162 and service on a local agent of the corporation in sufficient
service on the receiver.1
6 3
In contrast to his right to initiate actions without special order, the
receiver must obtain leave of court to appeal a decision adverse to the
corporation or its creditors, or such appeal will be dismissed 6 4 No
leave should be granted when the appeal would be in behalf of one
portion of the creditors as opposed to another rather than in the interest
of the corporation or its creditors as a whole. In such a case the dis-
satisfied creditor must bear the expense of his own appeal.' 0 5
Because the appointment of a receiver has no extra-territorial effect,
a chancery receiver has no power to bring suit as a matter of right
in another state.'66 However, he is usually permitted to do so as a
matter of comity where the action will not unduly prejudice state resi-
dents.'1 7  It would be proper to petition for leave of court to sue, stating
facts to justify this request,168 although our court has also ruled that
it is not necessary to obtain leave.' 69 Where a receiver is a quasi-
assignee or statutory successor to a corporation under the laws of the
"' Boyd v. Royal Insurance Co., 111 N. C. 372, 16 S. E. 389 (1892).
... Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371 (1894).
'::Biggs v. Bowen, 170 N. C. 34, 86 S. E. 692 (1915).
' Boyd v. Royal Insurance Co., 111 N. C. 372, 16 S. E. 389 (1892); State
v. Turner, 106 N. C. 691, 10 S. E. 1026 (1890).
16:'Grady v. Richmond & Danville R. R., 116 N. C. 952, 21 S. E. 304 (1895).
' Grady v. Richmond & Danville R. R., 116 N. C. 952, 21 S. E. 304 (1895) ;
Farris v. Receivers of Richmond & Danville R. R., 115 N. C. 600, 20 S. E. 167
(1894).
"16 C. D. Kenny Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 208 N. C. 295, 180 S. E. 697 (1935).
For an example, see Stagg v. George E. Nissen Co., 208 N. C. 285, 180 S. E.
658 (1935).
.65 Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina Bank, 127 N. C. 432, 37 S. E.
461 (1900) (not where question is merely over method in which fund should
be allocated among admittedly valid claims) ; Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg.
and Loan Ass'n., 118 N. C. 556, 24 S. E. 116 (1896) (not in interest of one por-
tion of stockholders against the other).
166 Van Kempen v. Latham, 195 N. C. 389, 142 S. E. 322 (1928); Kruger v.
Bank of Commerce, 123 N. C. 16, 31 S. E. 270 (1898).
""7 Van Kempen v. Latham, 201 N. C. 505, 160 S. E. 759 (1931) ; Van Kempen
v. Latham, 195 N. C. 389, 142 S. E. 322 (1928); Commonwealth Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Edwards, 124 N. C. 116, 32 S. E. 404 (1899). See Kruger v.
Bank of Commerce, 123 N. C. 16, 31 S. E. 270 (1898).
1': Van Kempen v. Latham, 195 N. C. 389, 142 S. E. 322 (1928).
- Van Kempen v. Latham, 201 N. C. 505, 160 S. E. 759 (1931). In such
a case if the receiver's authority is denied by the answer it should be proved by
a certified transcript from the foreign court. Van Kempen v. Latham, 195 N. C.
389, 142 S. E. 322 (1928) ; Person v. Leary, 127 N. C. 114, 37 S. E. 149 (1900)




state which chartered it, he can sue in a foreign jurisdiction as a matter
of right, for his authority must be honored under the full faith and credit
clause of the Federal Constitution. 7
In, bringing suit, the receiver acts in a dual capacity: (1) He as-
sumes all the rights of the corporation and can assert any claim be-
longing to it,171 and (2) he has all the rights of its creditors, whom he
also represents.
1 7 2
Where the right to relief depends upon the existence of claims
against the estate represented and the insolvency of such estate or
the necessity of collecting the demand sued on in order to pay
debts, those facts must be alleged, but where the right of action
does not depend upon the existence of such facts they need not
be alleged.' 73
In an action by or against the receiver all the rights, both legal and
equitable, of the corporation, its creditors, and the adverse party in the
suit may be settled.174 Thus the receiver can raise any defenses of the
corporation where it is defendant, 17 5 and a person sued by him can
assert his defenses against the corporation, provided they are also good
against its creditors.1 76  Where the receiver of a bank brings suit, the
surety on a note of an insolvent can set-off amounts due him for serv-
ices, deposits, and on certificates of deposit not yet payable ;177 and a
... Pink v. Hanby, 220 N. C. 667, 18 S. E. 2d 127 (1941). See Van Kempen
v. Latham, 201 N. C. 505, 160 S. E. 759 (1931) (However, his authority to sue
can have no effect in regard to the jurisdiction acquired over corporate property
by the North Carolina court through attachment). See Note, 6 N. C. L. Rv.
477 (1928).
"'1Harris v. Hilliard, 221 N. C. 329, 20 S. E. 2d 278 (1942) (Mortgagees
foreclosed on partnership's property and purchased it through an agent at their
own foreclosure sale) ; Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371
(1894) (Receiver sued on note owed to corporation).
"" Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N. C. 465, 76 S. E. 538 (1912) (Suit for unpaid
capital stock) ; Pender v. Speight, 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912) (Directors
retired capital stock while company was insolvent); McIver v. Young Hard-
ware Co., 144 N. C. 478, 57 S. E. 169 (1907) (Directors sold assets and took
payment directly to themselves) ; Graham v. Carr, 130 N. C. 271, 41 S. E. 379
(1902) (Corporation paid debt on which director was surety) ; Pender v. Mallett,
123 N. C. 57, 31 S. E. 351 (1898) (Defendants fraudulently put possession of
property in relative).
173 Harris v. Hilliard, 221 N. C. 329, 332, 20 S. E. 2d 278, 280 (1942).
17, Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371 (1894).
1 Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Tar River Lumber Co., 221 N. C. 89, 19
S. E. 2d 138 (1942) (statute of limitations); Brinson v. Mill Supply Co., 219
N. C. 505, 14 S. E. 2d 509 (1941) (ultra vires) ; Brinson v. Mill Supply Co.,
219 N. C. 498, 14 S. E. 2d 505 (1941) (idfra ires) ; Charles A. Riley Co. v.
W. T. Sears & Co., 154 N. C. 509, 70 S. E. 997 (1911) (usury).
1.. Seminole Phosphate Co. v. Johnson, 188 N. C. 419, 124 S. E. 859 (1924)
(note given for stock solicited in violation of Blue-Sky law).
""'Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19 S. E. 371 (1894). The
case held that, both as to debts owed by the bank and as to debts owed to the
bank, the fact that the debt had not matured was no bar. The court indicated,
however, that a surety could not use a debt to him as a set-off "where he is in-
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bank which is creditor of a corporation in receivership can apply the
latter's deposit against a note due from it.' 7 8  But a corporate debt
cannot be used as a set-off by a person assessed for an unpaid stock
subscription, for:
. . . the defendant's claim is lacking in one of the essentials of
a valid counterclaim, that the parties, debtor and creditor, must
claim in the same right. The receivers now claim for creditors,
and defendants are only entitled to an offset to the extent of the
dividends declared...179
Nor can a debtor use a claim against the company which was as-
signed to him after the appointment of the receiver as a set-off except
to the extent of the dividend which will be paid on it.'8 0
The receiver's right to initiate suit for recovery of corporate assets
is exclusive; so long as the right asserted is that of the company or
its creditors in general, no individual can sue on such right without
cause.' 81 The individual has the right, however, to sue for a loss
peculiar to himself, for in such case the cause of action does not pass
to the receiver.18 2  Hence where the negligence of officers causes a
misapplication of bank deposits and subsequent insolvency, the wrong
is to the bank and only the receiver can sue. 183 But if the bank is
insolvent to the knowledge of the officers when they receive a deposit,
the receipt is a wrong to the individual depositor, for which he can
bring action.' 84
demnified by the real debtor, or when the latter can be compelled to pay." Id.
at 331, 19 S. E. at 373. (If this were allowed, the principal might arrange for
the surety to pay by using his set-off and then might reimburse him).
1"8 Continental Trust Co. v. Spencer, 193 N. C. 745, 138 S. E. 124 (1927).
"'Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N. C. 465, 474, 76 S. E. 538, 542 (1912). See
Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 329, 19 S. E. 371, 372 (1894).
Although debts owed by a corporation in receivership cannot be used by a debtor
of the company as a counterclaim in a suit on a debt contracted while the receiver-
ship is in operation, a debt contracted by the receiver may be used for this purpose.
Charlotte, C. & A. R. R. v. Chester & Lenoir Narrow-Guage R. R., 118 N. C.
1078, 24 S. E. 769 (1896).
18" Brown v. Brittain, 84 N. C. 552 (1881). This case involved an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, but the principle embodied in it was approved in
Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 329, 19 S. E. 371, 372 (1894).
181 Roscower v. Bizzell, 199 N. C. 656, 155 S. E. 558 (1930); Ham v. Nor-
wood, 196 N. C. 762, 147 S. E. 291 (1929); Douglass v. Dawson, 190 N. C. 458,
130 S. E. 195 (1925); Bickley Clothing Co. v. Green, 187 N. C. 772, 122 S, E.
847 (1924).
182 Minnis v. Sharpe, 198 N. C. 365, 151 S. E. 735 (1930) ; Bane v. Powell,
192 N. C. 387, 135 S. E. 118 (1926); Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365, 29
S. E. 827 (1898).
18. Roscower v. Bizzell, 199 N. C. 656, 155 S. E. 558 (1930) ; Douglass v.
Dawson, 190 N. C. 458, 130 S. E. 195 (1925). Where, however, a private cor-
poration, not a bank, received money from plaintiff to be applied on mortgages
and the general manager misapplied such funds, plaintiff could sue since the cor-
poration held the money as trustee rather than debtor. Minnis v. Sharpe, 198
N. C. 365, 151 S. E. 735 (1930).
18, . . the taking and receiving money from the depositor, thus swelling the
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If the receiver is unwilling to enforce a right of the corporation
the individual can begin action alleging that he has made demand on
the receiver to sue but has been met with refusal. 8 5 No leave of court
is necessary in this event.18 6 He can also request that the court order
the receiver to sue or remove him.'8 7 The court may conclude, how-
ever, that because of the insolvency of the debtor or the weakness of
the cause of action it would be unwise to charge the assets of the re-
ceivership with the expense of the litigation, and may permit the in-
dividual to proceed at his own expense.' 88 If there then is a judgment
which substantially increases the assets of the corporation it inures to
the benefit of all stockholders and creditors. Therefore, the receiver
may be made a party defendant "in order that the recovery, if any, may
be distributed by him in accordance with the orders and decrees of the
court, just as other assets in his hands are distributed."'18 9
MISCONDUCT OF OFFICERS AND PREFERENCES
As representative of the company and its creditors, the receiver can
proceed against the directors and managing officers where there has
been mismanagement of the corporation. 190 For these persons are held
to be trustees or quasi-trustees in respect to the performance of their
official duties, and are liable for harm caused by wilful or negligent
failure to execute them properly.19' They are not, as a rule, responsible
for "mere errors of judgment, nor for slight omissions from which the
loss complained of could not have reasonably resulted."' 92 However,
"where they accept these positions of trust they are expected and re-
assets of an insolvent bank, is a wrongful act done by him personally and in-
dividually . . ." Wall v. Howard, 194 N. C. 310, 311, 139 S. E. 449, 450 (1927);
Bane v. Powell, 192 N. C. 387, 135 S. E. 118 (1926).
... Ham v. Norwood, 196 N. C. 762, 147 S. E. 291 (1929) ; Douglass v. Daw-
son, 190 N. C. 458, 130 S. E. 195 (1925) ; Coble v. Beall, 130 N. C. 533, 41 S. E.
793 (1902) (where demand on receiver is not alleged, demurrer should be sus-
tained).
"'0 Ham v. Norwood, 196 N. C. 762, 147 S. E. 291 (1929).
17 Ibid. The court can remove a receiver under N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-504
(1953) and 55-147 (1950)."'Ham v. Norwood, 196 N. C. 762, 147 S. E. 291 (1929).
2 Id. at 767, 147 S. E. at 293; Douglass v. Dawson, 190 N. C. 458, 130 S. E.
195 (1925).
100 Ham v. Norwood, 196 N. C. 762, 147 S. E. 291 (1929) ; Braswell v. Mor-
row, 195 N. C. 127, 141 S. E. 489 (1927) (Directors allowed secretary-treasurer
to take complete control and carelessly mature the stock of the building and loan
association before it reached par value) ; North Carolina Corporation Commission
v. Harnett County Trust Co., 192 N. C. 246, 134 S. E. 656 (1926); Douglass v.
Dawson, 190 N. C. 458, 130 S. E. 195 (1925) (failure to supervise business and
make loans only to those with adequate security) ; Besseliew v. Brown, 177 N. C.
65, 97 S. E. 743 (1918) (failure to attend directors' meetings; allowing secretary
to manage without supervision and abscond with funds).
1.1 Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N. C. 127, 141 S. E. 489 (1927):, North Carolina
Corporation Commission v. Harnett County Trust Co., 192 N. C. 246, 134 S. E.
656 (1926).
... Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N. C. 127, 130, 141 S. E. 489, 490 (1927).
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quired to give them the care and attention that a prudent man should
exercise in like circumstances and charged with a like duty, usually
the care that he shows in the conduct of his own affairs of a similar
kind .... 93
It has been held that until receivership "takes hold of the assets
they are subject to the action of the individual creditors, and such
preferences may be made by the corporation as a natural person might
make under the same circumstances."'0 4  Thus the insolvent com-
pany can confess judgment in favor of a pre-existing debt. 105 However,
the receiver can sue to retrieve preferences given to the officers and
stockholders of the corporation, for these persons will not be permitted
"to take advantage of their knowledge of the insolvent condition of the
concern, and their power to use and control the assets, to pay their own
debts, or to relieve them from special liabilities to the injury of other
creditors."' 9 6  He can recover from the officer who shortly before re-
ceivership draws a check on the corporation in discharge of its debt
to himself.'
97
Although an officer can buy assets of the corporation where the
price is fair, open, honest and without fraud, 9 8 the receiver can re-
cover if the proceeds from the sale were used by the company to pay
off a debt on which the officer was surety.9 9  While an officer can
make loans to the corporation and take a lien back,20 0 he cannot have
a pre-existing obligation secured by a mortgage or confession of judg-
"" Besseliew'v. Brown, 177 N. C. 65, 67, 97 S. E. 743, 744 (1918).
... Merchants National Bank v. Newton Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 507, 516, 20
S. E. 765, 766 (1894).
... Ibid. It was also held that the confession of judgment could be attacked
by creditors within sixty days, but the statutory provision relied on by the court
has since been dropped from N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-40 (1950).
... Graham v. Carr, 130 N. C. 271, 274, 41 S. E. 379, 381 (1902) ; Teague v.
Teague Furniture Co., 201 N. C. 803, 161 S. E. 530 (1931); Whitlock v. Alexan-
der, 160 N. C. 479, 76 S. E. 483 (1912); Hill v. Pioneer Lumber Co., 113 N. C.
173, 18 S. E. 107 (1893).
.'Teague v. Teague Furniture Co., 201 N. C. 803, 161 S. E. 530 (1931).
..8 Graham v. Carr, 130 N. C. 271, 41 S. E. 379 (1902). But where it was
voted to sell the assets to an officer for sixty per cent of their value, the officer
participating in the vote, such sale was "absolutely void" as to the receiver.
Pender v. Speight, 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912).
... Graham v. Carr, 130 N. C. 271, 41 S. E. 379 (1902). In Whitlock v.
Alexander, 160 N. C. 479, 76 S. E. 483 (1912) the company issued bonds secured
by a mortgage on its assets, which bonds were purchased by directors. The pro-
ceeds were used directly to discharge a demand note on which the directors were
sureties. The court, while not allowing the receiver to recover from the directors
because the proceeds never became "assets of the company, subject to general dis-
tribution," invalidated the mortgage. This left the directors in the position of
general creditors, and they were no better off than if they had paid the note and
become subrogated.
200 Hill v. Pioneer Lumber Co., 113 N. C. 174, 178, 18 S. E. 107, 108 (1893)
(". .. it would be looked upon with suspicion, and strict proof of its bona fides
would be required."); Eno Investment Co. v. Protective Chemicals Laboratory,
Inc., 233 N. C. 294, 63 S. E. 2d 637 (1951).
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ment.201 Where assets are sold for a consideration moving directly
to the -director-stockholders, the sale is void as to creditors.
20 2
The receiver can also destroy preferences created by the corpora-
tion's purchasing its own stock 20 3 or distributing assets through ex-
cessive dividends. 20 4  Because the capital stock is regarded as a trust
fund for creditors,20 5 an insolvent corporation cannot purchase its own
stock 2 6 even where it had made an agreement several years previously
to do so.207 Where it buys such stock and thereafter becomes insolvent
the receiver can recover from the shareholder the amount received by
him, where it is necessary to pay corporate debts.208 The stockholder
is free, of course, to sell his interest to an officer of the corporation.
209
Similarly, where corporate debts make it necessary, the receiver
can sue to collect as assets all unpaid subscriptions, including those
for which inadequate consideration was given.210 The stockholder can
be liable up to the amount of such unpaid subscription.211 Payment
for stock may be made in property which is reasonably necessary for
the legitimate business of the company,212 "and in the absence of actual
fraud the judgment of the directors as to the value of the property
20"'Hill v. Pioneer Lumber Co., 113 N. C. 174, 18 S. E. 107 (1893) (The
judgment can be attacked for fraud in an independent action). Where judgment
was confessed to one who held a note on which the president of the company
was surety, the court refused to hold the officers who had not been a party to
the transaction. It concluded that the diligence of the creditor, not the fraud of
an officer, had induced the confession. Howard v. Central Tobacco Warehouse
Co., 123 N. C. 90, 31 S. E. 371 (1898).20 2Mever v. Young Hardware Co., 144 N. C. 478, 57 S. E. 169 (1907). The
court allowed the receiver to enter a claim for the value of the assets in the re-
ceivership of the insolvent purchaser, and to recover a pro rata share of the amount
not to exceed what was due the creditors of the selling corporation.
.03 Shuford v. Brown, 201 N. C. 17, 158 S. E. 698 (1931) ; Fuller v. Motor
and Tire Service Co., 190 N. C. 655, 130 S. E. 545 (1925).
z-' Chatham v. Mecklenburg Realty Co., 180 N. C. 500, 105 S. E. 329 (1920)
(Judgment creditor does not need to have receiver appointed and can sue directly
shareholders who received assets). An existing creditor would not be prejudiced
by a stock dividend since no assets are divested thereby, but a subsequent creditor
might have a right to complain. If issued in good faith, however, a stock dividend
cannot be questioned. Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N. C 465, 76 S. E. 538 (1912).
20. Fuller v. Motor and Tire Service Co., 190 N. C. 655, 130 S. E. 545 (1925) ;
Heggie v. Peoples Building and Loan Ass'n., 107 N. C. 581, 12 S. E. 275 (1890).
2 0 Shuford v. Brown, 201 N. C. 17, 158 S. E. 698 (1931) ; Pender v. Speight,
159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912) ; Heggie v. Peoples Building and Loan Ass'n.,
107 N. C. 581, 2 S. E. 275 (1890)."0" Fuller v. Motor and Tire Service, 190 N. C. 655, 130 S. E. 545 (1925).
208 Pender v. Speight, 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912).
200 Shuford v. Brown, 201 N. C. 17, 158 S. E. 698 (1931) ; Shuford v. Scruggs,
201 N. C. 685, 161 S. E. 315 (1931).
2 0 Vaughan-Robertson Drug Co. v. Grimes-Mills Drug Co., 173 N. C. 502,
92 S. E. 376 (1917) ; Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N. C. 465, 76 S. E. 538 (1912) ;
Hobgood v. Ehlen, 141 N. C. 344, 53 S. E. 857 (1906) ; Harmon v. Hunt, 116
N. C. 678, 21 S. E. 559 (1895).
21 Wilson Cotton Mills v. C. C. Randleman Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 475, 20
S. E. 770 (1894).
"2 Hobgood v. Ehlen, 141 N. C. 344, 53 S. E. 857 (1906) ; Clayton v. Ore
Knob Copper Co., 109 N. C. 385, 14 S. E. 36 (1891).
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shall be conclusive."213  However, the North Carolina Supreme Court
has ruled that "a valuation grossly excessive and knowingly made may
be conclusive on this subject."214 Where this is the case the receiver
may collect the deficiency. The stock subscription cannot be met by
purchasing shares from another person rather than from the corpora-
tion.215  Neither can the subscriber vary the written terms of his sub-
scription by showing a secret agreement whereby he was only required
to take a smaller number of shares.2 16 He may not use as a set-off
an amount allegedly due him from the company,217 except to the amount
of the dividend it will produce.
21 8
PRESENTMENT OF CLAIMS
To minimize the expense of adjusting the affairs of the insolvent
corporation all persons who have claims against the debtor and desire
to participate in the distribution of the estate must present their claim
in writing to the receiver.2 1 9  In rare cases the appointing court will
grant leave to a claimant to bring instead an independent action against
the receiver where he proves his claim was disallowed and shows good
cause why separate suit should be allowed.
220
No definite rule can be adopted as to what is 'good cause,'
but the place where the cause of action arose, venue, the con-
venience of witnesses, additional costs, and other circumstances,
addressed to the discretion of the court, should be considered. 2 2 '
Where the claimant has once been a party, however, to bring such
21. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-63 (1950).
214 Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N. C. 465, 464, 76 S. E. 538, 540 (1912) ; Hob-
good v. Ehlen, 141 N. C. 344, 53 S. E. 857 (1906) ; Clayton v. Ore Knob Copper
Co., 109 N. C. 385, 14 S. E. 36 (1891) (Payment in property is sufficient except
where "simulated, grossly inadequate and fraudulent, and intended to serve fraudu-
lent purposes."). The burden of proving that the property was taken in payment
at its true value is upon the person who alleges payment. Goodman v. White,
174 N. C. 399, 93 S. E. 906 (1917).
... Vaughan-Robertson Drug Co. v. Grimes-Mills Drug Co., 173 N. C. 502,
92 S. E. 376 (1917). See Marshall Foundry Co. v. Killian, 99 N. C. 501, 6 S. E.
680 (1888).
.. Vaughan-Robertson Drug Co. v. Grimes-Mills Drug Co., 173 N. C. 502,
92 S. E. 376 (1917) (However, where the incorporators sign under agreement
with other subscribers that in so doing they act for them all, and the corporation
accepts the list as an asset and collects from the other subscribers, the incor-
porators are given credit for these other collections.).
217 Ibid.
21. Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N. C. 465, 76 S. E. 538 (1912).
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-152 (1950) ; National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 233
N. C. 83, 84, 62 S. E. 2d 501 (1950) ; National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N. C.
98, 59 S. E. 2d 593 (1950). See Crutchfield v. Hunter, 138 N. C. 54, 50 S. E.
557 (1905).
.20 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N. C. 98, 59 S. E. 2d 593 (1950);




separate suit, even with leave, hazards his chances of participating in
the assets because distribution may be allowed before his action is de-
termined.
222
The court may limit the time for presentation and proof of claims
in the receivership and may bar all claimants who fail to file within
this period from participating in the assets.22 3  However, the judge
may in his discretion permit presentation of a claim after the deadline,
and even after partial payments have been made in distribution if there
is enough of a surplus so as not to interfere with payments already
made.
2 24
The receiver must investigate each claim 225 and report his decision
on its validity and priority to the term of the superior court subsequent
to his finding. Exceptions thereto may be filed within ten days after
notice of the receiver's findings and not later than within the first three
days of the term by any person interested.226  "The judge may, in his
discretion, extend the time for filing such exceptions.1 227  If on excep-
tion "a jury trial is demanded, it is the duty of the court to prepare
a proper issue and submit it to a jury; and if the demand is not made
in the exceptions to the report the right to a jury trial is waived.
'228
.22 Delafield v. Lewis Mercer Construction Co., 118 N. C. 105, 108, 24 S. E.
10, 11 (1896) ("No reason appears why such claims of the appellant could not
have been determined in this action.").
221 "The court may also prescribe what notice, by publication or otherwise,
must be given to creditors of such limitation of time." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-152
(1950) ; National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 233 N. C. 98, 59 S. E. 2d 593 (1950).
2. Odell Hardware Co. v. Holt-Morgan Mills, 173 N. C. 304, 92 S. E. 6
(1917).
22 He has plenary power under N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-151 and 55-152 (1950)
to examine claiments and witnesses on oath in regard to the claims and to require
the production of relevant books and papers. National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe,
232 N. C. 98, 59 S. E. 2d 593 (1950).
221 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-153 (1950). "The term 'any person, interested' un-
doubtedly includes a claimant who wishes to resist a finding by the receiver
adjudging his claim to be invalid, or of less dignity than that alleged by him.
Moreover, a creditor, who has a valid claim, is certainly a 'person interested' for
the purpose of opposing a report of the receiver allowing the validity or priority
of other asserted claims, whose payment will exhaust or reduce the receivership
assets, otherwise available for the satisfaction of his claim." National Surety
Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N. C. 98, 102, 59 S. E. 2d 593, 596 (1950).
See Norfleet v. Tarboro Cotton Factory, 172 N. C. 833, 89 S. E. 785 (1944)
(failure to except to report barred relief).
Where exceptions are not filed within the first three days of the term follow-
ing the filing of the report they are not void and are before the court for con-
sideration in the absence of motion or order to strike. Benson v. Roberson, 226
N. C. 103, 36 S. E. 2d 729 (1945).
2-7N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-153 (1950).
. 28 Ibid.; North Carolina Bessemer Co. v. Piedmont Hardware Co., 171 N. C.
728, 88 S. E. 867 (1916) (error to decide controverted issues at chambers).
Where objections are filed to an order allowing a claim, which order adjudi-
cated contested issues of fact without consent, evidence or findings, it is error
to deny a motion to set the allowance aside and grant a hearing on the objections
which if true would be a valid defense to the claim. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.
v. Tar River Lumber Co., 224 N. C. 432, 31 S. E. 2d 353 (1944).
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ORDER OF PRIORITY
The order of priority of payment of claims proved against the re-
ceivership estate is determined by North Carolina law,229 except where
federal law prevails. 230 Partially because the basic North Carolina
statute on priorities is extremely terse,231 and principally because of
the myriad of fact situations that arise in receivership cases, there has
been much litigation on this point. Although it is not practical to dis-
cuss all possible priorities, a brief description of the order of preferences
can be given.
1. Property Not Belonging to Debtor
Receivership distributes only the debtor's property, so assets held
by the corporation as bailee would be returned to the true owner without
being subjected to liens of any sort.232 It would seem that the same
treatment should be given to goods acquired by the insolvent in a pur-
chase that was void as to non-assenting creditors of the vendor.238
2. Preferred Creditors
A primary purpose of receivership is "the preservation of the rights
of lien creditors as they exist at the time of the appointment ... ."234
Therefore, creditors holding mortgages, deeds of trust, and conditional
sales contracts are entitled to their security where the instrument was
recorded before the time of the receivership. 235  There are certain
22. Holshouser v. Copper Co., 138 N. C. 248, 50 S. E. 650 (1905) (foreign
state's license fees not preferred debt under North Carolina law).
230 Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, Inc., 234 N. C. 595, 68 S. E.
2d 263 (1951).
231 N. C. GEaN. STAT. § 55-137 (1950). "After payment of all allowances, ex-
penses and costs, and the satisfaction of all general and special liens upon the
funds of the corporation to the extent of their lawful priority, the creditors shall
be paid proportionately to the amount of their respective debts, and shall be
entitled to distribution on debts not due, making in such case a rebate of interest
when interest is not accruing on the same. Any surplus funds, after payment
of the creditors and costs, expenses and allowances, shall be paid to the preferred
stockholders according to their respective shares, and if there still be a surplus,
it shall be divided and paid to the general stockholders proportionately, according
to their respective shares."
232 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E.
767 (1928) (Receiver gets no title to bailed property): Cutter Realty Co. v.
Dunn Moneyhun Co., 204 N. C. 651, 169 S. E. 274 (1933).
23 First National Bank v. Waynesville Furniture Co., 200 N. C. 371, 157 S. E.
13 (1931) (Deed is null and void and "cancelled on the record"). But see
McIver v. Young Hardware Co., 144 N. C. 478, 57 S. E. 169 (1907) (Court
held sale void but indicated plaintiff might recover only pro rata with other
creditors of insolvent).
"'National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 50, 72 S. E. 2d 109, 123
(1952).
222 Vanderwal v. Vanco Dairy Co., 200 N. C. 314, 156 S. E. 512 (1930) (con-
ditional sale and chattel mortgage) ; Morris v. Y. & B. Corp., 198 N. C. 705, 153
S. E. 327 (1930) (Corporate property was deeded to president who personally
gave mortgage to lender and then reconveyed property to corporation which
assumed the debt).
In some cases where the mortgaged property has been sold, the notes given
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exceptions to this rule which will be taken up subsequently. 2 6  In
ordinary cases the priority created by the lien instrument wili be re-
spected even where it is given by the insolvent shortly before the
receivership to secure a pre-existing debt.23 7 Where, however, such
instrument is unrecorded at the beginning of the receivership it creates
no rights, since the general creditors then become "creditors for a
valuable consideration within the meaning of our registration stat-




Likewise, where a form of collateral is held by the creditor he is
secured to the extent of its value. Where the requirements of the law
of pledges are met the pledgee can realize on the assets he holds.
2 4
0
Similarly, a commission merchant who has advanced money has a com-
mon law factor's lien upon goods consigned to him while they are in
his possession, no written or verbal agreement being necessary.2 41 The
mechanics' lien242 gives the person who "makes, alters or repairs any
article of personal property at the request of the owner or legal posses-
sor of such property . . ." the right to hold it until paid for his work,
and to sell it after a stipulated period.243  His lien is superior to an
earlier mortgage lien,24 4 and although the creditor can be restrained
from selling until the validity of his claim is determined, he is entitled
to the value of the lien "free from any possible or probable charges
therefor may be considered as a substitute for the mortgaged property, and the
proceeds will be credited to the mortgage debt and not distributed among the
general creditors of the mortgagor. Harvey v. Kinston Knitting Co., 197 N. C.
177, 148 S. E. 45 (1929).
..0 In some cases it is necessary to charge the lien security with the expense
of receivership costs, taxes, and labor liens.
"" Vanderwal v. Vanco Dairy Co., 20 N. C. 314, 156 S. E. 512 (1930). As
has been already indicated, however, a director or stockholder cannot take ad-
vantage of such protection.
" 8Eno Investment Co. v. Protective Chemicals Laboratory, Inc., 233 N. C.
294, 297, 63 S. E. 2d 637, 640 (1951), referring to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20
(1950). Also: M. & J. Finance Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d
201 (1949); National Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Price, 195 N. C. 602, 143 S. E. 208
(1928) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E.
767 (1928). But see Gresham Mfg. Co. v. Carthage Buggy Co., 152 N. C. 633,
68 S. E. 175 (1910), where a creditor who had sold property to the company
on what appeared to be an unrecorded conditional sale contract was allowed a
lien, the court holding that the receiver took whatever title the company had and
nothing more.
.o Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1918).
240 Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 154 N. C. 1, 69 S. E. 743 (1910). But there
must be delivery to the pledgee. Boney & Harper Milling Co. v. J. C. Stevenson
Co., 161 N. C. 510, 77 S. E. 676 (1913).
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 44-75 (1950). See Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 154
N. C. 1, 69 S. E. 743 (1910).2, 2N. C. GEN. STAT. § 44-2 (1950).
242 If the value of the article exceeds fifty dollars he can sell after ninety
days from the time the work was completed; if fifty dollars or less, the period
is thirty days. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 44-2 (1950).
2. Johnson v. Yates, 183 N. C. 24, 110 S. E. 603 (1922). See Note, 1 N. C. L.
Rzv. 127 (1922).
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which might be fixed upon it, if it went into the hands of a receiver,
for costs and expenses of the suit .... ,,245
Certain non-possessory liens are also allowed. One who does work
on a building has a lien for the resulting debt on both the building and
lot on which it stands248 which is prior to every other lien or encum-
brance attaching to the property subsequent to the time at which the
work was commenced or the materials were furnished.247  A statutory
factor's lien can be obtained by proper registration, after which actual
or constructive possession by the factor is unnecessary, such lien to
be superior to all subsequent liens save one arising in favor of a
mechanic or landlord.248  Where property is attached a lien is created,
which commences at the date of the levy of attachment in the case of
personalty and which relates back to the time of the filing of the order
of attachment with the clerk in the lis pendens docket in the case of
realty,2 49 and such liens are superior to the rights of general credi-
tors.
25 o
The supreme court in an early case indicated that equitable liens,
which do not depend upon possession but which "arise either from a
written contract, which shows an intention to charge some particular
property with a debt or obligation, or are declared by a court of equity
from the facts and circumstances of a case," would be given priority
over general creditors' claims in receivership proceedings. 251 However,
although not ruling out altogether the possibility of recognition of such
liens,25 2 the court has refused to allow them in subsequent decisions.
2 53
Although bringing an action confers no right of priority upon the
2 5 Huntsman Bros. & Co. v. Linville River Lumber Co., 122 N. C. 583, 586,
29 S. E. 838, 839 (1898).2. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 44-1 (1950).
- King v. Elliot, 197 N. C. 93, 147 S. E. 701 (1929); Lookout Lumber Co.
v. Marion Hotel, 109 N. C. 658, 14 S. E. 35 (1891). But a mortgage recorded
prior to the time when work was begun is superior. McAdams v. Piedmont Trust
Co., 167 N. C. 494, 83 S. E. 623 (1914).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-70 to 44-74, and § 44-76 (1950).
24I N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.33 (1953).
" Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina Bank, 127 N. C. 432, 37 S. E.
461 (1900); German Looking Glass Plate Co. v. Asheville Furniture & Lumber
Co., 126 N. C. 888, 36 S. E. 199 (1900) (attachment on foreign judgment).
2" Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 154 N. C. 1, 4, 69 S. E. 743, 744 (1910).
2' "These liens . . . while ordinarily enforceable as between parties and
privies . . . as a general rule are treated as being void as to a receiver repre-
senting the general creditors of a receivership estate." Eno Investment Co. v.
Protective Chemicals Laboratory, Inc., 233 N. C. 294, 297, 63 S. E. 2d 637, 640
(1951).
...Eno Investment Co. v. Protective Chemicals Laboratory, Inc., 233 N. C.
294, 63 S. E. 2d 637 (1951) (Notes and deed of trust had been signed by only
the secretary of the corporation, and were undelivered and unrecorded) ; Hood v.
Macclesfield Co., 209 N. C. 280, 22 S. E. 2d 220 (1935) (alleged purchase of
lots and payment on insolvent's oral agreement to hold and convey them as buyer




plaintiff, when a judgment 254 has been obtained and properly docketed 255
the realty in the counties wherein such judgment is filed passes to the
receiver subject to a general lien in favor of the judgment creditor.
If several judgments have been so docketed the liens take priority
according to the time at which they were docketed.2 56  In the case of
personalty the judgment lien is effective if levy is made before re-
ceivership.2 57 Except where the insolvent is a public service corpora-
tion and the judgment is for "labor and clerical services performed,
or torts committed whereby any person is killed or any person or prop-
erty injured, '25 3 the lien is subordinate to prior registered deeds of
trust, mortgages, and conditional sales.259  If the judgment was ob-
tained by unconscionable means the other creditors can assert the
want of equity in the lien-holder, force him to surrender his priority
and share as a general creditor.
26 0
The creditor who holds collateral to secure his debt can neverthe-
less receive a pro rata dividend on the entire debt as it existed at the
time of the appointment of the receiver and rely on his collateral also.
261
If he wishes, he can first enter a claim for the entire amount to which
he would have been entitled as a general creditor, subsequently realizing
on his collateral to the extent necessary to bridge the gap between the
amount of the dividend and his total claim. Any excess collateral will
then be returned to the receiver.262 Possibly the secured creditor might
be permitted to completely exhaust his collateral first and then enter
a claim for the full amount of his debt as it existed at the time of the
appointment, obtaining a pro rata recovery to the extent necessary to
make him whole. It would be wise to avoid this latter procedure, how-
""The judgment against an insolvent corporation merely establishes the debt
and does not of itself give the judgment creditor a preference. Lacy v. Clinton
Loan Ass'n., 132 N. C. 131, 43 S. E. 586 (1903).
"' See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-234 (1953).
2' National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952);
Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina Bank, 127 N. C. 432, 37 S. E. 461 (1900).
"I
1N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-313(1) (1953). See Weisenfield & Co. v. McLean,
96 N. C. 248, 2 S. E. 56 (1887).
"I N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-44 (1950); Howe v. Harper, 127 N. C. 356, 37
S. E. 505 (1900). (Notice the limitations which have been put on § 55-44 by
amendment since the time of this cage, however.).
.. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Yadkin Cotton Mills, Inc., 200 N. C. 10, 156 S. E.
101 (1930).
20 Wilson Cotton Mills v. C. C. Randleman Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 475, 20
S. E. 770 (1894) (Plaintiff split his account to obtain J. P. jurisdiction and
more speedy treatment).
"'1 North Carolina Corporation Commission v. Central Bank & Trust Co.,
200 N. C. 808, 158 S. E. 925 (1931) ; Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jarrett, 195
N. C. 798, 143 S. E. 827 (1928); Boney & Harper Milling Co. v. J. C. Steven-
son Co., 161 N. C. 510, 77 S. E. 676 (1913) ; Merchants National Bank v. Flippen,
158 N. C. 334, 74 S. E. 100 ,(1912). See Winston v. Biggs, 117 N. C. 206, 23
S. E. 316 (1895) (assignment for the benefit of creditors).
.2.Boney & Harper Milling Co. v. J. C. Stevenson Co., 161 N. C. 510, 77
S. E. 676 (1913).
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ever, since at present North Carolina law on this point is uncertain.2 03
North Carolina confers a statutory lien on the assets of a corpora-
tion in favor of all persons doing "labor or services of whatever charac-
ter" in its regular employment for all such services rendered within
the two months preceding the date when precedings in insolvency
are actually instituted.2 64 Although labeled a lien the security con-
ferred is actually a "right of payment" 26 5 which gives such wages26
priority over all other liens that can be acquired on the assets of the
corporation.2 7 However, the section has been interpreted to subordi-
nate only those liens arising on the property after the corporation
acquires it268 since when the property passes to the corporation subject
to a mortgage, or a purchase money mortgage is given, the company
only takes the equity of redemption as an asset.200 Wages are defined
as "the compensation given by a master or employer to a hired person
or employee ... ,270 so contractors cannot,271 and officers of the cor-
203 The line of cases cited in footnote 261 supra uniformly upheld the so-called
Chancery rule, under which it is immaterial whether .the secured claimant realizes
on his security and then enters his full claim or receives a pro rata dividend on
his full claim first. However, in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Hood, 206 N. C. 639, 175 S. E. 135 (1934), where a secured depositor of a bank
had exhausted its collateral, and then filed a claim with the receiver for the full
amount and assigned such claim to the indemnitor who paid the creditor the
balance due, the court allowed the indemnitor a pro rata dividend only on the
sum which it had paid. Since a subsequent case, Rierson v. Hanson, 211 N. C.
203, 189 S. E. 502 (1936), indicated that in receivership cases the Chancery rule
was favored in North Carolina, it may be that the scope of the U. S. Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. rule will be restricted to the basic fact situation there present.
However, the decision should sound a note of warning for the creditor holding
security. See Note, 13 N. C. L. REv. 239 (1935).
204 N. C. GmN. STAT. § 55-136 (1950). There is no priority for wages earned
prior to the two-month period. Cummer Lumber Co. v. Seminole Phosphate Co.,
189 N. C. 206, 126 S. E. 511 (1925). And although an early case, Walker v.
Linden Lumber Co., 170 N. C. 460, 87 S. E. 331 (1915), held otherwise the
section does not apply to wages earned during receivership. National Surety
Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
2. Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, Inc., 234 N. C. 595, 600, 68 S. E.
2d 263, 268 (1951).
20. Priority will be given to that part of vacation pay which can be attributed
to the work done in the two-month period, but there is no priority for severance
pay since it is in the nature of liquidated damages. In re Port Publishing Co.,
231 N. C. 395, 57 S. E. 2d 366 (1949).
2011 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-136 (1950).
2"'0,One who takes a mortgage upon corporation property for money loaned
to operate it or to secure other debt, past or prospective, does so with the lnowl-
edge that . . . the lien of his mortgage is subject to be displaced in favor of
laborers' liens. . . " Humphrey Bros. v. Buell-Crocker Lumber Co., 174 N. C.
514, 519, 93 S. E. 971, 974 (1917).
269 Humphrey Bros. v. Buell-Crocker Lumber Co., 174 N. C. 514, 93 S. E.
971 (1917) (Company took some land subject to mortgage and bought other
land on purchase money mortgage); Walker v. Linden Lumber Co., 170 N. C.
460, 87 S. E. 331 (1915) (subject to mortgage); Roberts v. Bowen Mfg. Co.,
169 N. C. 27, 85 S. E. 45 (1915) (subject to mortgage).
170 Phoenix Iron Co. v. Roanoke Bridge Co., 169 N. C. 512, 86 S. E. 184
(1915).
271 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952);
Phoenix Iron Co. v. Roanoke Bridge Co., 169 N. C. 512, 86 S. E. 184 (1915).
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poration probably cannot2 72 obtain this priority. Nor can one who
performed work on a single occasion claim the priority.
273
3. Taxes
A federal statute27 4 provides a lien for taxes due27 5 the United States
on all property of an insolvent debtor, creating a right of priority which
attaches upon the appointment of a receiver.276 Since the state laborer's
lien arises at the same instant it is subordinate to such tax lien.277 The
tax priority is not effective "against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser,
or judgment creditor,"2 78 however, until notice has been filed in the
office of the register of deeds of the county within which the property
subject to such lien is situated.279 Consequently, one who dockets a
judgment, registers a chattel or real estate mortgage, or in some man-
ner obtains a "prior specific lien embracing specific property of the
debtor as contra-distinguished from a general inen embracing all his
property" 280 and has rights superior to the federal government in re-
ceivership. An attaching creditor who has not obtained judgment
when notice is filed has inferior rights.28 '
When a lien for state taxes has attached, by listing the property
in the case of realty and by levying on it in the case of personalty,
28 2
this lien is not terminated by subsequent receivership proceedings.
8 3
Even where the lien does not exist the taxes owed, together with in-
terest, penalties and costs, are "a preferred claim, second only to ad-
ministration expenses and specific liens. .. ,,284 Consequently, where
"' Alexander v. Farrow, 151 N. C. 320, 66 S. E. 209 (1909) (Case involved
assignment for benefit of creditors but the same policy would probably apply).
But see Mascot Stove and Mfg. Co. v. Turnage, 183 N. C. 137, 110 S. E. 779
(1922).
National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
='Rv. STAT. § 3466 (1875) ; 31 U. S. C. § 191 (1946).
"A debt due is a debt accrued, and a debt is accrued when all events have
occurred which fix and determine the liability of the debtor to the creditor."
Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, Inc., 234 N. C. 595, 599, 68 S. E. 2d
263, 267 (1951).
"' National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952)
Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, Inc., 234 N. C 595, 68 S. E. 2d 263
(1951) ; Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167 (1951).
27 Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, Inc., 234 N. C. 595, 68 S. E.
2d 263 (1951).
I7 NT. REV. CODE § 3672.
2INT. REv. CODE § 3672 allows state law to provide for the requisite notice.
See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 44-65 (1950).
20 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 45, 72 S. E. 2d 109, 120
(1952).
241Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167 (1951).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-340 (1950).
8' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-376 (1950). See Reichland Shale Products Co.
v. Southern Steel & Cement Co., 200 N. C. 226, 156 S. E. 777 (1930) (but not
where land has been disposed of before the receivership or sold by tax collectors).
... Section 105-376, passed in 1939, was apparently designed to overrule the
holding in Currie v. Southern Manufacturers Club, Inc., 210 N. C. 150, 185 S. E.
666 (1936) that where there was no levy on personality prior to sale of the
property by the receiver, there could be no preferred claim for taxes on such
property.
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the lien exists the state taxes have priority over all secured debts ;285
where there is no tax lien they still are superior to labor liens and
other general liens. The receiver has the duty to pay such taxes out
of the trust funds. 280  In addition, the tax officer has power to take
possession of as much property as is necessary to meet the taxes,
whether state, county, town or municipal, without applying to the court
for permission to do S0.287
4. Cost of Administration
The cost of administration of a receivership is the expense of col-
lecting, preserving, and distributing the assets of the corporation.288
It includes the allowance for the receiver, who is to be given, before
distribution, "a reasonable compensation .. . for his services, not to
exceed five per cent upon receipts and disbursements .... ,,289 Part
of this allowance may be granted while the receivership is in progress.
20 0
The amount approved is within the discretion of the court, and on
appeal291 it will not be altered unless based on the wrong principle
or clearly inadequate or excessive. 2 2  It is an expense payable in full
rather than a debt.
29 3
Court costs294 and necessary lawyers' fees 29 are also part of the
administrative expenses, as are broker's commissions, 208 bookkeeping
and clerical expenses, auditing costs, premiums on fire insurance on
the property in receivership, wages for watchmen employed to guard
the property, and the cost of sale of the assets in receivership. 2 7 Taxes
during receivership are also part of this cost.2 98
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-376 (1950). Federal tax liens, however, are su-
perior. See National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 105
(1952).
-. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-412 (1950). He is personally liable for the taxes
if he fails to do so. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-253 (1950).
.2. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-160 (1950).
' National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-155 (1950). This means a maximum of five per
cent on receipts and five per cent on disbursements. Battery Park Bank v. West-
ern Carolina Bank, 126 N. C. 531, 36 S. E. 39 (1900). See Graham v. Carr,
133 N. C. 449, 45 S. E. 847 (1903).
... Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina Bank, 126 N. C. 531, 36 S. E.
39 (1900). But see Delafield v. Lewis Mercer Construction Co., 118 N. C. 105, 24
S. E. 10 (1896) (allowance premature before work is finished).
2' If the order is interlocutory, exceptions should be entered. There can be
no appeal until the final order distributing assets. Battery Park Bank v. Western
Carolina Bank, 126 N. C. 531, 36 S. E. 39 (1900).
2"2 Where a false principle was used the award will be set aside; if the amount
is inadequate or excessive the court will alter or modify. Graham v. Carr, 133
N. C. 449, 45 S. E. 847 (1903). Accord, Talbot v. Tyson, 147 N. C. 273, 60 S. E.
1125 (1908) ; Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina Bank, 126 N. C. 531, 36
S. E. 39 (1900) .(Court slashed amount to be allowed).
2 2 Wilson Cotton Mills v. C. C. Randleman Cotton Mills, 115 N. C. 475, 20
S. E. 770 (1894).
_-4 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-155 (1950).
-02 See Graham v. Carr, 133 N. C. 449, 45 S. E. 847 (1903).
2. Harrison v. Brown, 222 N. C. 610, 24 S. E. 2d 470 (1943).
2"0 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
... Stagg v. George E. Nissen Co., 208 N. C. 285, 180 S. E. 658 (1935).
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As a general rule administrative expenses are charged against the
unencumbered assets of the estate and are not properly shared by the
secured creditors.21 9  "The effect is to tax the whole sum against the
holder of the lowest lien, and to pay the prior liens in full."300  How-
ever, where the encumbered property has been managed, cared for
and sold through the receivership, the court may decree the charges
therefor to be a claim superior to other liens.30 1 Administration ex-
penses have priority, in any event, over tax claims 30 2 and labor liens.30 3
Unless lien-holders consent they can under no circumstance be forced
to share in the expense of an operating receivership for a private cor-
poration.304 Consequently, the cost of this type of activity can be col-
lected only from income or the unencumbered assets of the estate. If
there is not sufficient property of this type, it will be applied to the
cost on a pro rata basis.80 5
5. General Creditors
A claimant who holds no security or lien and is not preferred by
statutory provision shares in the assets as a general creditor.3 0 6 He
participates only in what assets are left after all priority debts and the
cost of administration have been satisfied, prorating with others in like
"' Wood v. Woodbury & Pace, Inc., 217 N. C. 356, 8 S. E. 2d 240 (1940);
Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 280, 63 S. E. 1048 (1909).
Humphrey Bros. v. Buell-Crocker Lumber Co., 174 N. C. 514, 93 S. E. 971
(1917) drew on the rule as to labor liens to hold that one who lent to a company
on mortgage security did so with the knowledge that the mortgage might be
displaced by receivership expenses.
"' 0Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 270, 271, 67 S. E. 579
(1910).
"'1 Wood v. Woodbury & Pace, Inc., 217 N. C. 356, 8 S. E. 2d 240 (1940);
Bank of Pinehurst v. Mid-Pines Country Club, Inc., 208 N. C. 239, 179 S. E.
882 (1935) ; Stagg v. George E. Nissen Co., 208 N. C. 285, 180 S. E. 658 (1935).
"As a general rule, however, expenses of this character will not be charged
against the interests of lienholders where unencumbered assets are available for
their payment." National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 52, 72 S. E.
2d 109, 125 (1952).
In Kistler v. Wilmington Development Co., 214 N. C. 630, 172 S. E. 413
(1938) it was held that an order ratifying an agreement between the receiver
and a lienholder, in which the latter agreed to surrender his right for a defi-
ciency claim in return for the rents from the security property, was res judicata.
I-ence no charge for receivership expenses could be subsequently made.
30. N. C. G.N. STAT. § 105-376(d) (1950).
303 Labor liens are fixed, as we have seen, on the "assets" of the corporation.
By N. C. GELT. STAT. § 55-155 (1950) the administration expenses are to be paid
before any of the "assets" are distributed.
30 National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
The case abandoned the contrary rule of Armour & Co. v. People's Laundry Co.,
171 N. C. 681, 89 S. E. 19 (1916) and followed the dictun in Roberts v. Bowen
Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 27, 32, 85 S. E. 45, 48 (1915).
'0' This is true even though the debts were contracted with express approval
of the court. National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
30 "Preferences are not favored by the law, and can only arise by reason of
some definite statutory provision or some fixed principle of common law which
creates special and superior rights in certain creditors over others." Western
Carolina Power Co. v. Yount., 208 N. C. 182, 185, 179 S. E. 804, 805 (1935).
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position-parties with claims for breach of contract,30 7 ordinary un-
secured loans,308 unregistered deeds of trust,3 09 unrecorded mort-
gages,310 judgments entered after receivership has begun,31 ' and wage
claims not within the statutory priority standards.
12
6. Stockholders
If anything remains after all debts have been met it is returned to
the stockholders, the owners of preferred shares taking first, pro rata.
"If there still be a surplus, it shall be divided and paid to the general
stockholders proportionately .. ."313 Because the capital stock is con-
sidered to be a trust fund for the creditors,31 4 no attempts to set up a
preference in the charter or stock certificates will be effective in alter-
ing the statutory requirement.3 18
DISTRIBUTION AND DISCHARGE
Distribution of the corporate assets can be made only on order of
court31 6 and should not be allowed until all the funds have been col-
lected31 7 and the status of all claims entered against the corporation
ascertained.3 18 The receiver may, with permission of the court, use
such funds as are necessary to defray the cost of collection.3 10 No
order of distribution shall issue until the receiver has shown to the
satisfaction of the court that he mailed notice at least twenty days prior
to the time set for hearing to all parties who filed claims, giving the
date and place at which the hearing would occur.3 20 Although no
20. See Raleigh Banking and Trust Co. v. Safety Transit Lines, 200 N. C.
415, 157 S. E. 62 (1931) ; Arnold v. Porter, 122 N. C. 242, 29 S. E. 414 (1898).08 Costner v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Co., 155 N. C. 128, 71 S. E. 85 (1911).
o9 Eno Investment Co. v. Protective Chemicals Laboratory, Inc., 233 N. C.
294, 63 S. E. 2d 637 (1951).
.2 0 M. & J. Finance Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201 (1949).
211 Lacy v. Clinton Loan Ass'n., 132 N. C. 131, 43 S. E. 586 (1903).
.1. National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952).
.1. N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-137 (1950) and 55-61 (Supp. 1953).
.1. Fuller v. Motor and Tire Service Co., 190 N. C. 655, 130 S. E. 545 (1925).
21 Ellington v. Raleigh Bldg. Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 147 S. E. 307 (1929) ;
Kinston Cotton Mills v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 185 N. C. 7, 115 S. E.
883 (1923); Weaver Power Co. v. Elk Mountain Mill Co., 154 N. C. 76, 69
S. E. 747 (1910).
... National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N. C. 98, 59 S. E. 2d 593 (1950).
See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-153 (1950).
.1. National Surety Corp v. Sharpe, 236 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 2d 109 (1952);
Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 117 N. C. 308, 23 S. E. 450
(1895) ; same case, 118 N. C. 556, 24 St E. 116 (1896).
.1. National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N. C. 98, 59 S. E. 2d 593 (1950).
However, where a person who could have taken part in the proceedings instead
brings separate action, the court need not wait until his suit is settled before
ordering distribution. Delafield v. Lewis Mercer Construction Co., 118 N. C.
105, 24 S. E. 10 (1896).
.1. Strauss v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. and Loan Ass'n., 118 N. C. 556, 24
S. E. 116 (1896).
2. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-153 (1950). If the record shows that this was not
done the order will be vacated on appeal. National Surety Corp. v. Sharpe, 232
N. C. 98, 59 S. E 2d 593 (1950).
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exception was taken to the report of the receiver, objection can still
be registered to the order of distribution for it will present the question
of whether the priority of payment is correct, based on the receiver's
findings.
3 2 1
When all assets have been administered the receiver can apply for
an order of discharge, which cannot be granted until the receiver has
proved that he has met the same requirements as to giving notice that
apply in regard to orders of distribution.32 2 This allows any unsatis-
fied parties opportunity to object to the discharge.
3 2 3
After discharge if it is subsequently found that additional property
of the defunct corporation still exists it is proper to apply for a new
receiver.3 24 Because the liability of the receiver terminates with his
official existence and the order of discharge is not subject to collateral
attack, the correct method to recover against such receiver for mis-
conduct is to make a motion in the cause that his discharge be set aside
for fraud or mistake.
325
CONCLUSION
A discussion of the corporate receivership in any one particular
jurisdiction is necessarily subject to the restrictions imposed by the
lack of judicial decision or statutory provision relating to the varied
fact situations which may arise. In the foregoing we have endeavored
to outline the law of corporate receivership in North Carolina as the
same has been declared by statutes and decisions to date.
... Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167 (1951). Where an order
directing payment of a certain item is issued, exception taken to a subsequent
order in the proceedings entered after such claim had been paid is too late to
present the correctness of the order of payment. Eno Investment Co. v. Pro-
tective Chemicals Laboratory, Inc., 233 N. C. 294, 63 S. E. 2d 637 (1951).
11
2N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-153 (1950).
323 It was formerly the rule that when the party who had procured the ap-
pointment of the receiver had been satisfied he had a right to have the receiver-
ship terminated. Because receivership is for the benefit of all the creditors this
rule has been abandoned. Lenoir v. Linville Improvement Co., 117 N. C. 471,
23 S. E. 442 (1895).
.2 Howe v. Harper, 127 N. C. 356, 37 S. E. 505 (1900).
.2 Haas v. Cathey, 199 N. C. 796, 156 S. E. 92 (1950).
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